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ARTICLES 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 
Chris Brummer* 
 
Nowhere has disruptive technology had a more profound impact than in 
financial services—and yet nowhere do academics and policymakers lack a 
coherent theory of the phenomenon more, much less a coherent set of 
regulatory prescriptions.  Part of the challenge lies in the varied channels 
through which innovation upends market practices.  Problems also lurk in 
the popular assumption that securities regulation operates against the 
backdrop of stable market gatekeepers like exchanges, broker-dealers, and 
clearing systems—a fact scenario increasingly out of sync in twenty-first-
century capital markets. 
This Article explains how technological innovation “disrupts” not only 
capital markets but also the exercise of regulatory supervision and 
oversight.  It provides the first theoretical account tracking the migration of 
technology across multiple domains of today’s securities infrastructure and 
argues that an array of technological innovations are facilitating what can 
be understood as the disintermediation of the traditional gatekeepers that 
regulatory authorities have relied on (and regulated) since the 1930s for 
investor protection and market integrity.  Effective securities regulation will 
thus have to be upgraded to account for a computerized (and often virtual) 
market microstructure that is subject to accelerating change.  To provide 
context, this Article examines two key sources of disruptive innovation:  (1) 
the automated financial services that are transforming the meaning and 
operation of market liquidity; and (2) the private markets—specifically, the 
dark pools, electronic communication networks, 144A trading platforms, 
and crowdfunding websites—that are creating an ever-expanding array of 
alternatives for both securities issuances and trading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first three decades following the birth of U.S. federal securities 
regulation in the 1930s, the biggest obstacles to achieving the core policy 
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goals of investor protection and market integrity came from either political 
resistance or cyclical changes in the economy that unveiled managerial 
incompetence, inadequate resources for regulatory authorities, or 
increasingly imaginative financial schemes.  But, for all the resistance, the 
market ecosystem subject to securities regulation was quite stable and 
experienced only incremental change.  As a result, the forward-looking 
legislative framework enacted in 1933 and in 1934 had time to mature and 
even improve itself based on the presumptive market role and dominance of 
key financial intermediaries. 
By the turn of the century, however, securities regulation started to 
experience far more profound challenges, as an unprecedented degree of 
technological innovation began to upend the market microstructure 
animating capital markets.  With advances in computer processing and 
information technology, key financial intermediaries like exchanges, 
investment banks, and broker-dealers began to find themselves pushed to 
the side by new market participants.  Combined with intermittent reforms to 
the capital raising process, public offerings found themselves too eclipsed 
by new, increasingly sophisticated private players and venues that began to 
host and mediate capital market liquidity.1 
These developments are coming under scrutiny in the wake of the 
financial crisis and as market innovation and disruption have achieved 
breathtaking speed.  More money is now raised in private placements than 
in public offerings as new platforms have been developed to process 
demand;2 securities of blue-chip firms are as readily traded off exchanges 
as on them; human beings are no longer relied on to execute trades; and 
private websites are poised to list ventures and early stage ventures.  
Collectively, these developments, which are only accelerating with 
technological innovation, have left regulators flat-footed as they, too, try to 
find their way in the new ecosystem.  To cope with the change, securities 
authorities have adopted either a “hands-off” policy or one of almost 
comical “concessions”—such as the recent discovery of Twitter and the 
blessing by the agency of tweets as a means of communicating with 
investors.3 
Academics, meanwhile, have not fared much better.  The acceleration of 
disruptive innovation is driving deep divisions—to paraphrase Larry 
Downes—between, on the one hand, the industrial law of the last century 
and the regulatory machinery to enforce it and, on the other hand, the digital 
 
 1. See VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, SEC, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2009–2012, 
at 8–9 (2013); Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls:  The Demise 
of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 903–04 (2008); 
Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3392 
(2013). 
 2. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 1, at 8, 10. 
 3. Jessica Holzer & Greg Bensinger, SEC Embraces Social Media, WALL STREET J. 
(Apr. 2, 2013, 7:49 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732361 
1604578398862292997352 [http://perma.cc/NPJ2-TRB4]. 
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economy that now drives financial markets and competitive advantage.4  As 
a result, changes in today’s market microstructure are subsumed by various 
academic disciplines under generic categories of “disruption”—and in the 
process undermine the capacity to discriminate among different regulatory 
challenges—or commentators fail to fully grasp changes related to one 
another to collectively bend the structure of capital markets. 
To be sure, as this Article shows, not all “disruption” is the same.  Some 
forms of disruption are almost entirely technology based.  Disruption under 
this guise can arise in the crevices of existing regulatory frameworks.  New 
technologies can connect financial market participants in ways that bypass 
institutions that have been required by law or market forces to screen 
investors, bridge information asymmetries, or ensure market integrity.  Yet 
other innovations may have appeal or be popular precisely because of their 
ability to engage, undermine, or elide existing regulatory and market 
systems.  In either case, technology can create opportunities for market 
participants to do things that they were never able to do before, or to do 
things better (or faster) than before, and in the process, challenge or 
arbitrage established regulatory architectures. 
Meanwhile, other forms of disruption have their origins in deregulatory 
policies that have spawned new market infrastructures.  That is, legislative 
or agency reforms can and do create purposeful loopholes or exemptions 
through which a new market infrastructure arises endogenously as a 
response and, in the process, upends traditional regulatory and market 
systems.  Regulation-driven disruption can consequently create gaps in 
existing rules and safeguards, but at the same time, erect new forms and 
tactics for investor protection.  And yet, in virtually every case, regulatory 
and market disruptions overlap.  Regulatory reforms allow new 
technologies to grow or chart new paths.  Technology can spur regulatory 
responses or even opportunities that enable arbitrage or change incentives 
of market participants in unexpected ways. 
These nuances make it difficult to develop a coherent typology of 
disruptive technology for securities market regulation and even more 
difficult to develop a coherent set of regulatory responses.  Although it is 
now taken for granted that disruptive technologies as a whole are generally 
“less complicated, more accessible, and less expensive” than preexisting 
ones, their impact on regulatory infrastructures are often diverse and thus 
demand different policy responses.5  Making things worse, traditional 
securities regulation is itself premised on the sale of securities to the 
“public,” or has been premised on a relatively stable set of market 
intermediaries—a fact scenario that no longer exists today.6  Technological 
 
 4. See generally LARRY DOWNES & PAUL NUNES, BIG BANG DISRUPTION:  STRATEGY IN 
THE AGE OF DEVASTATING INNOVATION (2014). 
 5. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruption Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 175, 182 
(2014). 
 6. For perhaps indeed this reason, few theoretical articles have focused on technology 
and securities regulation per se.  For some of the most notable, see generally, for example, 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?:  The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities 
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innovation runs circles around the ability of regulators to respond and 
adapt.  The proliferation of new market infrastructures as a result challenges 
academics and policymakers alike at both conceptual and operational levels 
of regulatory design. 
Creating a suitable theoretical framework for addressing disruptive 
innovation thus requires optics flexible enough to accommodate and 
examine diverse and dynamic market ecosystems against expanding sets of 
policy goals and regulatory mandates.  This, in turn, requires eschewing 
traditional assumptions about how regulatory policy is operationalized and 
forces commentators to evaluate concretely the functional implications of 
disruption on the market. 
Embracing such an approach proffers powerful policy analytics.  
Disruptive innovation, as this Article demonstrates, is often a story of not 
only market participation but also regulatory disintermediation.  
Consequently, when faced with the prospect of new transformative 
technologies, policy responses should identify what actor or aspect of the 
preexisting financial system is potentially being disintermediated by the 
technology.  Second, and closely related, market supervisors should explore 
whether other microstructural developments or new institutions fill (or 
could fill) the regulatory vacuum or, alternatively, exacerbate the 
disintermediation at issue.  And only then, finally, after undertaking the 
analysis, should interventions be devised to promote the underlying policy 
goals of the respective regulator while recognizing the dynamism of 
constantly evolving markets.  To demonstrate this, this Article examines 
varying sources of disruptive innovation:  automated electronic trading, 
dark pools of liquidity for exchange-traded securities, 144A trading 
platforms for private placements, and crowdfunding websites for start-ups 
enabled under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. 
By recasting disruptive innovation as one of financial market (and 
gatekeeping) disintermediation, this Article also provides a roadmap for 
 
Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195 (1997) (noting the potentially information-enhancing 
benefits proffered by the internet); Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the 
Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985) [hereinafter Information 
Technology] (same); Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for 
Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753 (1997) (considering the promise of 
technology-enhanced investing for addressing information asymmetries).  Otherwise, most 
other thoughtful interventions have focused on discrete manifestations of disintermediation 
in select markets or markets enabled by looser regulatory oversight. See generally Joan 
MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:  Crowdfunding and 
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011) (examining the operation of 
crowdfunding exemptions and its impact on securities regulation); Donald C. Langevoort & 
Robert B. Thompson, IPOs and the Slow Death of Section 5, 102 KY. L.J. 891 (2014) 
(examining exemptions and their impact on the market for public offerings); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems:  A Law 
and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999) (highlighting the value of 
Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) and the need for enabling, as opposed to mandatory, 
securities regimes); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 179 (2012) (noting the growth of private placement intermediaries and the impact on 
disclosure). 
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better conceptualizing the future of securities regulation and rethinking the 
means with which we practice it.  Although 144A trading, high frequency 
trading, dark pools, and crowdfunding have attracted a good deal of 
attention over the last couple of years from journalists, policymakers, 
scholars, and practitioners, they have yet to be addressed collectively from 
one theoretical vantage point.  As a result, an all-too-obvious silo thinking 
has emerged, failing to connect microfinance to crowdfunding, the 
technological innovations in crowdfunding to new private placement 
platforms, and so on.  This Article represents the first attempt to connect the 
dots.  By tackling the hard work of charting these developments along a 
market and regulatory continuum, we will see how technology imposes a 
variety of interdependent and interrelated repercussions throughout 
securities markets that are fundamentally reshaping how they operate—and 
changing the effectiveness of the New Deal-era oversight and supervision. 
Before jumping into this Article, one methodological note is in order.  
One of the difficulties of theorizing the scope of the impact of technological 
disruption and securities regulation is that it involves assessing both 
regulatory and market infrastructures across diverse issue areas and 
contexts.  As such, a multidisciplinary approach is required that employs 
broad-based regulatory history, market theory and practice, and rigorous 
institutional analytics.  With this in mind, in Part I, I offer an overview of 
the New Deal regulatory apparatus that continues to govern securities 
markets today.  Part II introduces and explains the most dramatic forms of 
technological innovation in securities markets, and Part III then shows how 
these innovations disintermediate traditional regulatory gatekeepers and 
thus disrupt longstanding regulatory practice.  Finally, in Part IV, this 
Article borrows from the New Governance literature7 to outline 
administrative reforms useful for engaging the challenge of disruptive 
innovation and highlights the necessity of adaptive regulatory regimes for 
high-tech capital markets animated by constant microstructural change. 
I.  TWENTIETH-CENTURY MARKET 
AND REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE 
The legislative framework for U.S. securities regulation is both a 
response to the financial shenanigans leading up to the stock market crashes 
of the late 1920s and a national framework for ongoing supplemental 
regulation and oversight to be practiced by the then-newly created 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the Commission”).  As 
such, even after more than a half decade of reforms and revisions, it reflects 
both the primary policy concerns of the time, as well as the market 
ecosystem that dominated the early twentieth century. 
Securities transactions in the decades preceding the creation of the 
federal securities laws were simple, albeit flawed.  A company seeking to 
raise capital issued and sold securities to the public, often assisted by an 
 
 7. See infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
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investment bank that would help identify an appropriate wholesale and 
retail market for the securities and potentially underwrite the offering.  
Brokers then marketed shares to the public.  Depending on the prestige and 
notoriety of the company, the firm’s shares or bonds were listed on an 
exchange or traded over the counter.8 
The issuance and sale of securities were, if not laissez-faire activities in 
the strictest sense, at least chronically under regulated.  A collection of 
relatively weak “blue sky laws,” actions under common law fraud, or 
reputational constraints were relied on to restrict market participants’ bad 
conduct.9  With few investor protections, issuers lied about their earnings, 
plans, and even operations; brokers marketed securities unscrupulously, 
often lying to unsuspecting investors; and exchanges listed securities of 
questionable quality, with little to no help in maintaining quality or market 
stability. 
By the early 1920s, individuals such as Ivar Krueger graced the cover of 
Time magazine after raising millions of dollars to fund a Ponzi scheme built 
on repaying loans and doling out dividends to investors until the money 
dried up.10  Along the way, neither the exchange nor brokers monopolizing 
its trade contacted or discussed the financial statements of the presumed 
auditor.  Similarly, increasingly complex frauds were committed against the 
public—like that perpetrated by the Musica brothers, who created an entire 
network of fictitious firms to bolster false financial statements (and inflate 
earnings) for the then-New York Stock Exchange (NYSE or “the 
Exchange”) listed McKesson & Robbins.11 
 
 8. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 353 (2012) (noting that listing 
on certain exchanges was “a means of signaling quality to potential traders”). 
 9. Although state level initiatives had been launched selectively in other states targeting 
specific industrial activities and disclosures for out-of-state issuers, Kansas is largely 
credited with enacting the first blue sky law in 1911, which required companies selling 
securities in the state, as well as stockbrokers, to register with the bank commissioner and 
disclose information about their operations. See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make 
Miserable Policemen:  Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 725, 731 (2003).  That said, the most sweeping rules were those embraced in New 
York.  In New York, brokers were prohibited from making false or misleading rumors, 
statements, or advertisements in connection with the sale of securities and from engineering 
the kinds of fictitious transactions that were making their way to the front pages of the 
nation’s newspapers. Id. at 731–32.  Moreover, the Martin Act, adopted in 1921, authorized 
the New York Attorney General to investigate and seek injunctions against fraudulent 
securities practices or manipulative activities, with much lower-level burdens of proof than 
those required under common law. Id. at 732.  Nevertheless, even in New York, insider 
trading was largely permitted, as was margin trading, which allowed banks to make short-
term loans using securities as collateral via what was then known as the “call money” 
market. Id.  Furthermore, with the economy roaring, actions were rare. 
 10. See Justin Fox, Forget Charles Ponzi (and Bernie Madoff).  Ivar Kreuger Is the All-
Time Fraud Champ, TIME (Jan. 5, 2009), http://business.time.com/2009/01/05/forget-
charles-ponzi-and-bernie-madoff-ivar-kreuger-is-the-all-time-fraud-champ/ [http://perma.cc/ 
PB99-C9FA]. 
 11. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS:  THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 139–40 (2006). 
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The results were catastrophic.  As President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
close aid, and future Supreme Court Justice, Felix Frankfurter bemoaned: 
During the height of the greatest speculative carnival in the world’s 
history, billions of new securities were floated, of which a large part had 
no relation to the country’s need and which inevitably became worthless; 
worthless not merely for millions who had sought speculative gains, but 
for those other millions who sought to conserve the savings of a 
lifetime.12 
After the October 1929 stock market crash and the following years of 
falling stock prices, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency 
launched an investigation, known now as “the Pecora Committee,” into the 
causes of the crisis.13  The proceedings culminated in an assertion of a new 
“social control of finance,” operationalized via the 1933 Securities Act 
(“the Securities Act” or “the 1933 Act”) and the 1934 Exchange Act (“the 
Exchange Act” or “the 1934 Act”), along with subsequent streams of SEC 
rulemaking that in many ways continue today.14 
Underpinning the reforms was an understanding of issuers, broker-
dealers, and exchanges as the primary nodes of market infrastructure and 
the central culprits of the undue market “speculation” leading up to the 
crisis.15  Regulating each as agents of the investing “public” thus not only 
provided a response to the earlier decade of fraud, but also a forward-
looking framework for future market oversight.  Key to the regulatory 
policies was disclosure—in the case of firms and broker-dealers, disclosure 
about material information relating to issuers of securities and in the case of 
exchanges, information relating to the market value of such securities. 
A.  Public Companies 
The centerpiece of the New Deal legislative framework was enhanced 
disclosure for companies selling securities.  Investors, authorities 
recognized, needed protection.  A prerequisite for such protection was 
having access to information necessary to making informed investment 
decisions.  Up to that point, investors were far from being guaranteed “full 
information” relating to their investments.  With no requirement or 
government agency credibly compelling disclosures from companies, 
“prospectuses used to sell stocks were ‘little more than notices’”16 and were 
 
 12. A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 
95 VA. L. REV. 841, 849 (2009). 
 13. Cf. id. at 852. 
 14. Id. at 846–72. 
 15. This is demonstrated in the very scope of the Pecora Commission’s work:  to make 
an inquiry into any company issuing securities, to make an investigation of the “business 
conduct and practices of security exchanges and of the members thereof,” and “to make a 
thorough and complete investigation of the practices with respect to the buying and selling 
and the borrowing and lending of securities.” COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK 
EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 2 (1934). 
 16. Markham, supra note 9, at 734 (citing United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 
639 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)). 
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“too often deliberately misleading and illusive.”17  With this in mind, and 
with the Krueger and Musica scandals still fresh in the memory of the 
country’s voters, Roosevelt promised in his presidential nomination 
acceptance speech to “let[] in []the light of day on issues of securities, 
foreign and domestic, which are offered.”18 
The Securities Act was, among other things, the first legislative step for 
achieving this goal.  According to its dictates, whose relevant parts for this 
discussion were finalized in 1964, if a company crossed a certain 
threshold—by either selling securities to the public,19 allowing for their 
securities to be traded on exchanges,20 or becoming too big21—it would 
have to make financial statements public and ensure their accuracy.22  Then 
under the Exchange Act, promulgated a year later in 1934, these disclosures 
had to be updated on a quarterly and yearly basis and subject to varying 
scrutiny by auditors and other securities professionals.23 
Section 5 of the Securities Act additionally subjected public offerings of 
securities to certain procedural hurdles.24  In its original iteration, the statute 
limited sales efforts to after the SEC had declared the registration statement 
“effective.”25  This then ignited a two-decade-long debate between 
regulators and industry as to the “proper balance between the demand for 
pre-effective marketing and the concerns about gun-jumping.”26  
Eventually, a compromise was reached in 1954 that prohibited sales and 
marketing of materials until a registration statement is filed and imposed a 
waiting period of at least twenty days, during which marketing efforts could 
commence, but securities could not be sold.27  Only after the registration 
statement became effective, which generally involved SEC review, could 
sales commence.28 
All along, a new federal antifraud regime was launched.  Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 created an expansive private right of 
action for misrepresentations and omissions made in connection with the 
sale of securities.29  Meanwhile, section 11 of the Securities Act imposed 
 
 17. 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 27 (3d ed. 1993). 
 18. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:  A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 19 (3d ed. 
2003). 
 19. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). 
 20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g). 
 22. Id. §§ 78m(a), (i). 
 23. Id. § 78m. 
 24. Id. § 78e. 
 25. Id. § 77e (noting that no sales can commence “unless a registration statement is in 
effect”). 
 26. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 6, at 891. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 77h; see also id. § 78f (requiring that marketing be made through a 
legally valid prospectus). 
 28. See id. § 78f. 
 29. See id. § 78j(b); Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2014). 
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heavier liability for misrepresentations in a registration statement,30 just as 
section 12 gave potential rescission rights where the procedural hurdles 
were not followed.31 
At the same time, some limited exemptions to both the procedural and 
informational regulations were available.  The broadest exemption was 
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act (now section 4(a)(2)), which exempts 
transactions “not involving any public offering”—what today are known as 
“private placements”—from the registration requirements of section 5.32  In 
1935, the SEC then interpreted the exemption to mean that companies can 
generally avoid registration if offerings are made among a small number of 
sophisticated investors and not broadly distributed.33  Supreme Court and 
other federal cases, over the following twenty years, also elaborated the 
ambiguous clause and stressed the need for investors not only to be 
sophisticated, but also to have access to all relevant information.34  
Secondary sales also had to meet the same strict investor thresholds and, as 
always, avoid trading on exchanges.35 
Collectively, the New Deal framework created a broad regulatory 
perimeter for securities issuances.  Under sections 5 and 15(d) of the 1933 
Act, which were added in 1936, public offerings required registration with 
the SEC.36  Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act, meanwhile, restricted the 
number of shareholders an unregistered company could have after 
achieving a significant economic size before becoming subject to reporting 
obligations.37  Similarly, section 12(b) effectively prohibited unregistered 
companies from listing their securities on exchanges like the NYSE.  
Instead, trading would have to take place in the over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets where transactions have been executed through opaque and ad hoc 
networks of brokers and dealers, which have historically been more 
expensive.38  Once any of the thresholds under sections 15(d), 12(b), or 
12(g) of the 1934 Act were met, periodic reporting under the Exchange Act 
became mandatory.39  Finally, privately issued securities under section 4(2) 
 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 31. Id. § 77l. 
 32. Id. § 77d(2). 
 33. Relevant factors included the number of offerees, relationship of the offerees to each 
other, the number of units offered, the size of the offering, and the manner of the offering. 
See Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act 
Release No. 285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935) [hereinafter Letter of General Counsel]. 
 34. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953) (noting that 
because “[t]he design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of 
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions . . . the applicability of [the 
section] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection 
of the Act”). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b). 
 36. Id. §§ 77e, 78o(d) (requiring registration of public offerings). 
 37. See id. § 78l(g). 
 38. Walter Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance:  The National Market 
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of the 1933 Act could only be bought and sold amongst investors who could 
demonstrate high levels of sophistication and access to information 
normally required in a registration statement.40 
Circumventing registration thus likely increased the costs of capital for 
many companies.  They could either avoid registration by limiting the 
number of shareholders they had and limiting the trading of their securities 
on thin OTC markets, which lacked reliable means of tracking the prices of 
stocks,41 or they could issue private securities to a small pool of 
sophisticated investors where secondary trading opportunities were limited 
and where notice of offerings had to be discrete.42  In either case, investors 
charged a premium for the limited transferability, lower transparency, and 
higher risk of the security and, in the process, drive up the cost of finance. 
B.  Broker-Dealers 
Broker-Dealers would also attract more regulatory scrutiny.  Oversight 
would, however, be asserted incrementally, and often circuitously, via a 
series of delegations of authority to a range of supervisors.  Eventually, 
however, the SEC would come to assume some of its most direct authority 
as a growing volume of technology-enabled securities transactions 
overwhelmed the back office operations of securities firms. 
1.  Delegation Under the New Deal 
The 1929 stock market crash needed enablers, and broker-dealers topped 
the list of likely culprits.  After all, exchanges needed broker-dealers to 
make markets in listed securities (a topic discussed in the following 
subsection), and issuers needed salesmen to sell their securities.  And, as 
brokers were paid on commission, not the appreciation of the securities, 
they were incentivized to do whatever it took to sell stocks or to act on their 
own account (as what the law recognizes as “dealers”) and to make money 
on speculation and market volatility. 
The criticism was not without reason.  Indeed, turn of the century brokers 
turned out to be especially good at beguiling people into parting with their 
money and, according to a 1933 House Committee Report, routinely 
worked “securities of an essentially unsound character” on an 
“unsuspecting public.”43  Moreover, less than fair and honest marketing 
was combined with margin investing as investors (and broker-dealers) 
borrowed money to make investments and outsized bets.  The result, as 
Frankfurter acknowledged during the subsequent consideration and debate 
 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQ-Periodic-Reporting-Requirements-for-
US-Issuers-Overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/KJ9W-VHTY]. 
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 41. See MARK INGEBRETSEN, NASDAQ:  A HISTORY OF THE MARKET THAT CHANGED 
THE WORLD 38 (2002). 
 42. See id. at 31–32. 
 43. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 27. 
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of the Exchange Act, was a speculative bubble that would upend the 
country’s capital markets and savings capacity: 
By all the subtle and mesmerizing arts of modern salesmanship, the 
sellers of securities had so extended the field of security buyers that 55 
per cent of all savings . . . went into publicly marketed securities. . . .  The 
enormous, easy profits from their distribution stimulated the creation and 
sale of billions in securities, which have burdened industry and wasted or 
misdirected the capital resources of the nation.44 
With this in mind, the Exchange Act was created to bear down more 
forcefully on the sales and marketing of securities.  As mentioned above, 
section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 prohibited the sale of securities through 
material misstatements and omissions in the marketing of investments 
during initial public offerings (IPOs), secondary trading, and even private 
placements.  As such, it created a broad and federal layer of investor 
protection wherever the sale of a security arose. 
The Exchange Act also provided the basis for more direct oversight for 
broker-dealers in particular.  Though lacking precision as to the degree of 
discretion the SEC would ultimately enjoy, section 15 of the Exchange Act 
empowered the SEC to require broker-dealers to register with the 
commission and to register the securities in which they traded.45  The SEC 
was also charged with the supervision of a firm’s structure and taking 
measures to assure their solvency.46  Accordingly, under this writ of 
authority, the SEC promulgated rules requiring the registration of all 
broker-dealers involved in OTC transactions and mandated that registered 
firms meet minimum capital requirements and provide adequate disclosures 
to investors.47 
Critically, OTC broker-dealers were also ultimately required to join what 
was then the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) (that later 
became the Financial Industry Registry Authority (FINRA)), the self-
regulatory organization (SRO) for the industry created in 1939.48  In time, 
NASD imposed obligations on broker-dealers to “know thy customer” (a 
requirement that the NYSE also imposed on member broker-dealers).49  
 
 44. Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 12, at 849 (emphasis added) (quoting Felix 
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 45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1)–(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Robert L.D. Colby & Lanny A. Schwartz, What Is a Broker-Dealer?, in 2 BROKER-
DEALER REGULATION 2-1, 2-5 to 2-7 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 48. See Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2211, 1939 WL 
36389 (Aug. 7, 1939).  Under the Maloney Act, which revised the Exchange Act, market 
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extension, federal) oversight. See INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 42. 
 49. For an overview of FINRA’s “know thy customer” expectations, see Prepare to 
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That is, broker-dealers were required to have “reasonable grounds for 
believing that [a] recommendation [was] suitable for [a] customer upon the 
basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security 
holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”50  This suitability rule 
then itself became interpreted to require brokers to obtain information 
concerning the customers’ other securities before making suggestions 
concerning highly speculative investments.51 
Finally, section 7 of the Exchange Act tackled the challenge of margin 
lending—which, as discussed above, had in part enabled and exacerbated 
the crisis by allowing market participants to borrow money to purchase 
shares.  As with section 15, the issue would be tackled through delegation.  
Here, however, the Federal Reserve Board, not the SEC, was given the 
authority to regulate “the amount of credit that may be initially 
extended . . . on any security,” and broker-dealers were prohibited from 
extending credit for any customer in contravention of the rules.52  With its 
newfound powers, the Federal Reserve subsequently promulgated 
Regulation T, which prohibits the extension of credit on marginable 
securities beyond a certain percentage of those securities’ value.53 
Though only of limited relevance for this Article, it must be added for the 
sake of completeness that in addition to the regulation of brokers, even 
more basic advisory and investment management functions were targeted as 
well under other congressional dictates.  In the years leading up to the Great 
Depression, investment companies and trusts had become commonplace in 
American society.  Unfortunately, although these companies were, as Ken 
Gailbraith noted, “greatly admired marvels of the time,” they were also 
highly problematic, and the SEC observed that many investment companies 
sold securities like door-to-door salesmen, advancing the interests of fund 
managers over investors.54  To speak to abusive practices pertaining to the 
counsel given to investors, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 imposed 
on managers a range of disclosure and recordkeeping obligations (and later, 
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standards of conduct for registered advisors).55  Meanwhile, the Investment 
Company Act requires mutual funds to register with the SEC and prohibits 
self-dealing by fund professionals.56  Furthermore, the legislation bans 
outright affiliated transactions that would otherwise create incentives for 
fund managers to exploit shareholders.57 
2.  1960s Crisis Response, or New Deal 2.0 
One unusual aspect of this approach was that, despite the enormity of the 
job, the SEC’s authority was both modest and shared with other actors.  
This institutional posture in turn generated considerable ambiguity about 
the writ of the agency’s authority to regulate broker-dealers.  Two decades 
later, however, the SEC’s position was reaffirmed and bolstered with 
additional new responsibilities, which deserve special mention, especially 
in light of the particularly important role played by technological change in 
driving the agency’s ascent to power. 
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, much of the policymaking 
energy relating to brokers and dealers, beyond the surveillance of fraud, 
focused on the commissions paid to brokers on exchanges.58  But in the 
1960s, Wall Street found itself on the brink of crisis in part due to its own 
good fortune.  As SEC Chairman Hamer Budge testified, an exponential 
growth in securities trading threatened, quite unexpectedly, to undo the 
industry:  “[B]rokerage firms [found] themselves in the paradox of being 
forced out of business by having too much business.”59  Between 1964 and 
1968, the average daily reported volume on the NYSE jumped 265 percent, 
from just under five million shares per average day in 1964 to nearly fifteen 
million in December 1968.60 
In theory, the rise in transactions was good for business.  But broker-
dealers were not equipped to handle the back-office paper crunch.  
Financial transactions at the time required settlement and clearing 
procedures where orders were routinely written by hand and stock 
certificates were physically handed over and delivered to investors.  With 
the jump in volume and inadequate manpower, however, this system broke 
down:  “Stock certificates and related documents were piled ‘halfway to the 
ceiling’ in some offices; clerical personnel were working overtime, six and 
 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21. 
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 57. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21. 
 58. See infra Part I.C. 
 59. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 451 (alteration in original). 
 60. Id. 
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seven days a week, with some firms using a second or even a third shift [for 
staff] to process each day’s transactions.”61 
Part of the increase was due to the rise in institutional investing.  
Professional market makers exploited multiple telephone lines and faxes to 
connect themselves to other firms and financial institutions in order to 
increase the volumes of transactions they made.  But keeping track of it all 
was messy.  On the front end, pricing was far from efficient, especially for 
smaller, less well-known OTC stocks.  Unlike the NYSE, where, as seen 
below, special broker-dealers (aptly named “specialists”) had monopolies 
on the shares they traded, traders and market makers routinely competed 
with one another to buy and sell a particular security.62  But they did so 
with relatively little information.  Most broker-dealers subscribed to 
services publishing daily quotes for bid and ask prices for certain stocks, 
and the quotes would set the parameters for most trading taking place that 
day.  But no rules required larger firms to post quotes, or, for that matter, 
follow through on the quotes they gave.  Furthermore, firms polled by the 
company providing the list were not those doing the largest volume of 
trading in that particular stock, and their own internal records were often 
flawed or incomplete.  So, these stock quotes were very far from being an 
accurate real-time source of data.63 
With transactions multiplying, complaints to the SEC about broker-dealer 
conduct quadrupled.64  Some firms responded by hiring new people, pairing 
them with experienced workers and putting them to work immediately to 
handle and process orders.  According to the leading treatise of the period, 
this only resulted in poor training and a decrease in output by experienced 
workers who had to teach colleagues how to do their jobs.65  Meanwhile, 
other firms attempted to abruptly adopt computerized facilities and leapfrog 
the problem of manual recordkeeping.  This too, however, was largely 
unsuccessful and even doomed leading Wall Street brokerages unprepared 
and inexperienced in technology.  Goodbody & Co., then the fifth-largest 
firm on Wall Street, was doomed, according to a Merrill Lynch banker 
familiar with the company, due to its “overambitious efforts to automate.”66  
When it was subsequently saved in a merger, it only succeeded in 
increasing the firm’s woes.  “It was trapped in the midst of change:  efforts 
to automate failed, while manual procedure was deserted in anticipation of 
automation’s success.”67  As Joel Seligman reports, other “instant 
computerization” problems plagued other firms that faced liquidation, 
including Lehman Brothers, which only narrowly escaped collapse.68 
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The combination of breakdowns in back-office operations, higher 
operational costs, bad brokerage management, and debt had, by 1969, sent 
more Wall Street brokerages out of business than at any point in U.S. 
history.  In response, the SEC eventually imposed higher requirements on 
brokerages than the modest $5000 net capital threshold the agency had 
required of broker-dealers prior to the crisis and the NYSE’s $50,000 
requirement for member firms carrying customers’ accounts.69 
Even more critically, to strengthen the authority of the SEC over the 
industry, Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection Act,70 which 
gave the SEC authority to require an SRO to adopt rules, practices, and 
inspections relating to the financial condition and health of the SRO’s 
members.71  Four years later, the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 were 
passed, which, among other things, brought broker-dealers who traded 
exclusively on national securities exchanges directly into the regulatory fold 
and made them subject to the same Exchange Act requirements (and SEC 
oversight) as OTC broker-dealers.72  For the first time, the NYSE not only 
governed conduct but also took a step toward overseeing the financial 
integrity of key market intermediaries given what was believed to be the 
relative inflexibility of firms to automate and the challenges of 
intermediating in high order, high data environments. 
C.  Stock Exchanges 
The final objective of the postwar regulatory infrastructure was the 
oversight and supervision of stock exchanges.  The regulation of broker-
dealers, though an important aspect of the post-crash securities oversight, 
was not enough.  Instead, as Justice Frankfurter himself acknowledged, 
“another . . . evil . . . must ultimately be reached, and that is the creation of 
boom markets for stocks through . . . the Exchange.”73  No longer would it 
or should it be the means for generating destructive speculation by the 
American investing public. 
As a conceptual matter, stock exchanges have always exerted both 
economic and regulatory importance.  On the one hand, unlike OTC 
markets, where dealers processed ad hoc orders free of listing requirements 
and disciplinary rules, exchanges have been critical price discovery 
mechanisms for stocks and bonds of major companies.74  Once securities 
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were released onto exchanges, buyers could send their orders to brokers, 
who then transmitted the order to brokers on the exchange and to specialists 
who made markets for the securities.  The bid and ask prices for the orders 
(or quotes) could then be compared on the floor and made public.  By thus 
providing a focal point for trading, exchanges not only afforded investors 
opportunities to enter and exit investments quickly,75 but they also 
generated valuable data for pricing stocks and bonds traded on secondary 
markets. 
Indeed, the extent of concentration was so great that for many experts it 
created strong anticompetitive undercurrents.  To understand why, it is 
important to note that price discovery has historically been an expensive 
business, with low levels of competition.  Trading floors allowed the 
congregation of buyers and sellers of securities, but 
real estate had to be purchased on the front end for a large trading facility.  
Then a large trading floor had to be built on which traders could 
collectively operate and interact.  Finally, facilities had to be added for 
communication with linked institutions, either in the form of courier posts 
or phone banks. 
 Floor exchanges were also highly dependent upon human skill that is 
not easily replicable.  When a client ma[de] a limit order, a floor broker 
must calculate (or guess) the appropriate amount to initially bid for on the 
exchange on behalf of the client based on his monitoring of the day’s 
trading.  Likewise, [personnel] must monitor limit orders and respond 
quickly to orders as they arrive.  All along, time is critical—the longer it 
takes for execution of an order, the more likely the order may be cancelled 
or matched with another investor.  Due to the various emotional, 
intellectual, and even physical demands of the job, the supply of skilled 
traders ha[d] always been limited and labor costs, high.76 
Consequently, the barriers to entry to the exchange business were high, and 
exchanges frequently could charge super premiums for their work.77 
Yet, significant responsibilities accompanied such authority.  Stock 
exchanges, even in the nineteenth century, were expected to fulfill the 
“important mission” of establishing “a barrier between the public and those 
fraudulent, superficial, and impracticable enterprises and schemes 
which . . . [were calculated] to induce the public to invest in them.”78  
Exchanges thus had established listing committees tasked with examining 
listings by the late 1880s.  By the 1930s, the NYSE in particular required 
that companies seeking to list (or sell) their securities on its floors first “file 
an application describing in detail the firm’s capital structure, history, 
liabilities, properties, financial statements over the past five years, and 
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officers” and imposed restrictions on short selling when the markets 
dived.79  Exchanges also required that specialists—the broker-dealers 
dominating the trade of some securities—make themselves available to 
stabilize markets where the price of a security jumped or fell erratically.80 
The stock market crash of the late 1920s, however, would prove 
untrammeled self-regulation to be insufficient.  For one, issuers looking to 
bypass the NYSE’s rules always could choose to register an “unlisted” 
security on any of the other eighteen securities exchanges that “permitted 
securities to be traded on an ‘unlisted’ basis.”81  Furthermore, and arguably 
more troubling, even the NYSE failed to enforce vigorously its own 
standards.82  Indeed, exchanges lacked clear rules with regard to how 
financial statements should be reported to investors or to exchanges.83  
Consequently, in the congressional hearings leading up to the creation of 
the Exchange Act, many observers felt that self-regulation lacked teeth and 
seriousness.  Frankfurter in particular heartily agreed that the exchange was 
“long overdue” for governmental regulation, advising Roosevelt:  “There 
has been more than ample time for self-regulation, and self-regulation they 
have shown is not in them.”84 
Several steps were thus taken over the ensuing decades to rein in 
exchanges.  As discussed above, the challenges posed by unlisted 
(essentially OTC) securities were remedied, at least in part, by bringing 
OTC securities under the Exchange Act’s size and public offering 
parameters.85  If issuers attained a certain economic impact or passed the 
shareholder threshold, they were required to report to the SEC.86  Although 
price discovery was not as high as that offered on exchanges, disclosure as 
to the underlying issuer was mandatory. 
Reforms for exchanges would, at least ostensibly, be more direct.  The 
Exchange Act endowed the SEC under sections 5 and 6 with an affirmative 
grant of rulemaking authority and broad regulatory powers over the nation’s 
securities exchanges (dubbed “national securities exchanges” in the 
enabling legislation), their members (who were largely broker-dealers), and 
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the securities traded on exchanges.  Along with overseeing the registration 
of exchanges, the SEC received more explicit competencies in areas aimed 
at ensuring reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, and other 
charges, as well as sweeping residual powers to alter or supplement 
exchange rules in “supplemental” areas of regulatory concern.87 
Furthermore, the Exchange Act targeted the internal operations of 
exchanges.  It explicitly authorized the fledgling SEC to write rules to 
“regulate or prevent floor trading by exchange members” and “to prevent 
excessive off-floor trading by members if the Commission found it 
‘detrimental to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market.’”88  Attempts 
to circumvent exchange rules relating to exchange-listed securities could 
thus be minimized. 
Similar writs of authority were granted with regard to the regulation of 
specialists.  As mentioned above, a particular brand of broker-dealers called 
“specialists” made themselves available to stabilize markets and “make” 
markets as either buyers or sellers where the price of a security jumped or 
fell erratically.  In order to do so, they maintained a special order book 
where other brokers would leave customers’ limit orders and where they 
had advance knowledge of the orders from the market.  With the help of the 
order book, specialists could maintain a sufficient inventory of a stock 
where it appeared demand would spike and few might be willing to sell, 
and they could liquidate investments in order to free up capital to purchase 
securities where customers sold shares and no other buyers were available.  
This created significant informational advantages, however, insofar as 
specialists (or their friends) could extract super-premiums for their market-
making activities.89  In light thereof, section 11(b) of the Exchange Act 
grants extraordinary power to the Commission to oversee specialists and 
restricts the specialists to those dealings reasonably necessary to permit 
them “to maintain fair and orderly markets.”90 
That said, many attempts to take on the often-conflicted nature of the 
exchange specialist were scrapped by the SEC in order to preserve the 
liquidity of the NYSE, which hosted upwards of 85 percent of the country’s 
top stocks and the stability-enhancing services the specialists provided.91  
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Yet the lighter touch would have significant consequences for the business 
of trading.  Customers seeking to trade NYSE-listed stocks would have 
little bargaining power over the Commission’s members of the exchange 
charged.  And as a member-owned nonprofit organization, a club of leading 
brokers and dealers, the exchange’s own rules in the matter were largely 
geared toward increasing the profits of exchange professionals and not 
toward the investing public.92 
Gradually, however, as the nation’s market ecosystem developed and 
matured, the monopoly rents exercised by the exchange members would 
serve to push customers to respond in ways that would undermine the very 
price discovery that made exchanges attractive.  By the time the 1960s 
arrived, institutional investors had become the largest owners of equities—a 
development in part aided by technological advances.93  This change in 
equity ownership heightened the importance and costs of high 
commissions.  Because institutions traded large blocks of shares, the 
commissions added up and were more concentrated.  As institutions sought 
ways to circumvent the fees and costs, several techniques became popular.  
One of the most dominant approaches was to trade NYSE securities in the 
OTC market, often with a non-NYSE member.  Another was to trade shares 
on a regional exchange. 
The NYSE, seeing a potential threat to its liquidity, reacted to these 
trading strategies in the form of Rule 394, later renamed Rule 390, which 
prohibited NYSE members from executing trades in NYSE-listed securities 
outside of the exchange.94  That way, the argument went, liquidity could be 
maintained and not diluted.  But it brought along the useful bonus of 
allowing NYSE members to price gauge customers.  Institutional investors 
balked and complained to the SEC. 
The SEC responded in 1968 by initiating a review of fixed commission 
rates, which lasted nearly a decade.95  As a matter of policy, the NYSE’s 
actions created a difficult dilemma.  On the one hand, liquidity was indeed a 
public good that was necessary for the price discovery process.  At the same 
time, the NYSE’s actions were patently anticompetitive and allowed the 
members to extract monopoly rents from traders.  With the second issue 
ultimately outweighing the first, the SEC abolished fixed rates in 1975 and, 
in the process, eased the economic incentives that were driving trading to 
regional and OTC markets.96 
Yet arguably the most remarkable aspect of the investigation is that it 
would bring to light other less savory aspects of the market and the 
increasing fragmentation of the market.  As policymakers became more 
familiar with the off-exchange trading generated by anticompetitive market 
practices, both the SEC and Congress highlighted the need for a central 
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market system for securities to maintain a robust and interconnected trading 
environment.97  So along with the other legislative reforms, Congress 
granted the SEC explicit authority to mandate a “national market system” 
for the trading of securities and to protect the price discovery mechanism 
necessary to support robust capital markets.98 
Notably, this congressional writ did not resolve the issue of the proper 
balance between consolidation and competition; rather, it suggested that the 
SEC was to encourage both.99  With no clear instruction, the SEC’s 
response was very much a compromise in which both policy objectives 
were embraced.  The SEC required NASD “to disseminate the best bid and 
ask quotes made public on the floor of the exchanges and by significant 
OTC market makers.”100  In this way, the purpose of transparency would be 
advanced.  But there were limits.  The SEC did not, namely, require the 
publication of all quotes, but instead obliged the dissemination of only the 
best quote of each exchange and OTC market maker.101  Furthermore, the 
SEC revised Rule 390 to permit NYSE members to route orders to the OTC 
market where better prices were available and allowed them to make 
markets in an expanding array of NYSE stocks, though “few members 
availed themselves of these opportunities.”102  Instead, deep structural 
changes in the NYSE’s market operations waited over two decades, during 
which time other regulatory and technological changes rocked the industry. 
II.  DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN NEW FINANCE 
The regulatory perimeter established by the Securities Act and Exchange 
Act and their implementing rules would remain robust for nearly a half 
century.  This was in large measure due to the relative durability of the 
market ecosystem of the time.  In short, securities markets’ infrastructure 
was not one prone to change, so the actors animating them could be 
regulated with some degree of consistency.  The NYSE in particular had 
changed surprisingly little since its creation in 1792.103  Investors interested 
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in buying or selling securities placed orders with brokers on trading floors.  
These orders comprised either “market orders,” which required the broker 
to trade immediately at the best possible price, or “limit orders,” which 
specified a maximum price if buying or a minimum price if selling.  From 
there, orders were executed on trading floors operated by the exchange.  
The broker forwarded the order to the trading room of his brokerage house, 
which then phoned the order to a clerk working on the exchange.  In some 
instances, the clerk then handed the order to a broker working on a floor, 
who then walked the order to a post where a designated trader, “the 
specialist,” acted as an auctioneer and, in many exchanges, as a market 
maker for the securities. 
Similarly, change came only incrementally to the trading of shares over-
the-counter.  As they had throughout the nineteenth century, retail investors 
seeking to buy an unlisted stock could make a limit order for a particular 
security with their broker.  That broker would then decide to sell those 
shares himself at the prices specified by the limit or market order (based on 
assumptions or guesses relating to the prevailing price of the security) or, 
alternatively, send that order to a kind of wholesale broker, known as a 
“market maker,” who might develop a particular specialty in that security.  
But, again, in contrast to the NYSE specialists, OTC market makers might 
compete with one another to buy or sell particular securities.104  
Technology would, above all else, merely upgrade the relationship among 
the players by allowing faster communication, through telephones, that 
accelerated the ability of intermediaries to gather (albeit incomplete) data 
about the demand and price of a stock.105 
As the late 1970s and 80s arrived, however, more change came to the 
trading floors of America’s stock exchanges in the subsequent three decades 
than in the previous two hundred years.  As demonstrated in the following 
sections, these changes not only came to redefine how markets operated 
but, by extension, redefined the incentives and very structure of the U.S. 
securities ecosystem.  Not only did they enable the increasing automation in 
financial services, but they also enabled the development of new private 
capital markets that circumvented some of the traditional triggers of 
comprehensive oversight accompanying public offerings. 
A.  Automated Financial Services 
Technology has impacted the delivery of financial services in two key 
ways.  First, trading has evolved in ways in which human beings have 
found themselves displaced by computers in the execution of trades.  
Second, and even more profoundly, technological developments have 
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enabled machines, rather than humans, to make the very decisions as to 
what securities should be bought and sold by executing highly complicated 
statistical analyses based on pre-set programming and directions. 
1.  Computerized Trading 
The first major changes to the market ecosystem were tied to the advent 
of computerized trading.  Prior to computerized trading, “[f]inancial 
information was disseminated slowly, usually by ticker tape, and telephonic 
communication was expensive.”106  The trading environment was 
consequently primitive:  middlemen were not uncommonly inches from one 
another on exchanges, allowing for the expeditious identification of 
counterparties.  Or they shouted quick orders to one another over the phone. 
The pricing of orders, and their handling, was in turn highly inefficient.  
Instead of relying on research or statistical departments to generate accurate 
pricing data for securities, many broker-dealers focused on their incoming 
orders to generate guesses about the market, and because orders were not 
widely distributed, specialists and market makers imposed high bid-ask 
spreads to generate exorbitant profits.  Meanwhile, as was seen in the back-
office crisis that played out throughout the 1960s, orders for both OTC and 
exchange-listed securities were poorly processed by overwhelmed market 
intermediaries.107 
In the mid-1970s, however, advances in computer processing allowed 
new forms of trading and connectivity to arise among trading professionals.  
Spurred in part by the SEC’s own acknowledgement of the need to 
“automate” trading in the 1960s, early personal and desktop computers 
were embraced by financiers in an effort to lend more structure to the 
market.108  In 1966, a NASD Automation Committee was convened to help 
create a system where a centralized computer could replace a floor and 
allow dealer participants to quote prices for stocks.109  After a half decade 
of work, the NASDAQ was created and boasted an electronic quotation 
system that displayed orders from a previously dislocated network of 
dealers.  Over time, it became the world’s first electronic stock market110 
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and allowed dealers to compete in the provision of quotes for securities in 
real time with one another.111 
Meanwhile, the NYSE introduced its Designated Order Turnaround 
(DOT) system, which electronically routed smaller market orders directly to 
specialists.112  And in 1984, the DOT system became SuperDOT for its 
ability to link financial firm members to trading specialists located at 
trading posts on the trading floor.113  Akin to a Craigslist for stocks of the 
1980s, the system operated as an electronic bulletin board for institutional 
investors displaying a stock’s price.  Orders showed up on an order display 
book for specialists on the exchange to see at terminals on their 
workstations.  Later in 1984, NASDAQ established a similar system called 
the Small Order Execution System (SOES) to allow brokers for small 
investors trading less than one thousand shares to place orders directly with 
market makers.114 
That said, professional trade execution remained, for the most part, mired 
in the nineteenth century.  NYSE traders, as they had for years, continued to 
scream out orders on trading floors and scribble numbers on scraps of paper 
to keep records of their dealings.115  Hand signals indicated how many 
shares they wanted to buy or sell, and the first to signal a trade won.116  
Meanwhile, 
most [NASDAQ] market makers traded over the phone or used a 
computer system called SelectNet, which displayed bids and offers on a 
screen and allowed traders to place orders through a window on their 
terminals, much like a primitive instant message system.  While [it ran] 
on a computer network, SelectNet [did not] actually implement the trade.  
It merely transmitted information about bids and offers to human market 
makers, who executed the trades by hand.117 
 But the technological upgrades over time allowed for new kinds of profit-
making ventures that redefined how money could be made in the market.  
Such profit-making opportunities became especially prevalent with the 
advent of personal computing in the 1980s—and ushered in the first of what 
is considered today to be “high speed” traders.  With human beings still 
responsible for inputting most trades by hand, traders who could connect to 
actual trading platforms directly and execute trades by computer were able 
to make orders to buy and sell faster than their competitors.  The seminal 
opportunity for technological upgrade came in 1986, when the NASDAQ 
Workstation software was unveiled, which could be downloaded onto a 
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DOS-powered personal computer.118  The genius of the program is that it 
enabled traders to create a customized list of stocks to follow and, equally 
as important, to monitor market makers’ activity.119  Then, in 1994, another 
leap forward was taken with the debut of the Workstation II, an open-source 
platform that eventually opened channels for speedy traders to trade via 
SOES and, later, opened other trading platforms.120  Enterprising 
entrepreneurs could watch stock activity and execute trades via keystrokes 
when they saw the market moving.121 
Leveraging technology not only to access prices but also to execute 
trades turned the sector inside out.  By the early 1990s, speed no longer 
meant absolute proximity to the trading floor.  Traders with terminals and 
the right market-surveillance software could beat longstanding incumbents 
and insiders (i.e., dealers and specialists on the NYSE and market makers 
on the NASDAQ) to the punch on trades from hundreds of miles away. 
In this way, electronic trading presented the possibility of making money 
off of the market makers and reversed the traditionally privileged position 
market makers had vis-à-vis traders.122  In the case of the SOES system, 
which was the first system infiltrated by high speed traders (who are now 
called the SOES “bandits”), dealers and brokers who had dominated the 
sale of a particular security were suddenly forced to become more diligent 
about the markets they made and the prices they offered.123  A moment’s 
lapse could expose the trader to a move by a bandit that exploited poorly 
calculated spreads.  In this way, speed arguably catalyzed more, not less, 
market integrity and accuracy with regard to the minute-by-minute ticks of 
the market. 
2.  Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence 
For all of the advantages electronic trading brought to some smart 
traders, computerization itself was only a prelude to arguably even larger 
changes in the securities industry that would eventually take place.  Another 
decisive development, which continues to advance today, is the increasing 
dependence on, and deployment of, computers and computer processing to 
not only execute trades and collect market data but to also make 
independent trading decisions. 
Computer decisions are based on algorithms—set procedures and 
functions—to program trading in such a way as to respond to new data 
according to the pre-set objectives or functions of investors.  These 
algorithms are designed to deliver the highest return, or risk-adjusted return, 
and define certain kinds of parameters to be included in the risk calculation.  
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For example, market liquidity, volatility, or other factors could be 
introduced into the basic trade execution programming, and through these 
analytic variables, an automated trade decision is made.124 
By creating programs to respond instantaneously to new information, 
algorithmic trading enables degrees of data analysis and execution speed 
previously unattainable.  Early on, traders would be able to simultaneously 
analyze and compare the movements of not just three stocks or thirty, but 
thousands, at a time, every second.  And with time, traders developed ever 
more complex execution models that attempted to maximize the objective 
function established by programmers in more novel and advanced ways.  
Programs not only calculate trades, and execute them in increasingly 
elaborate manners, but also sift through data variables to identify the most 
relevant inputs and to learn from the evolving movements or actions of 
other market participants.  Thus, over time, a range of different trades and 
programs inhabited the market ecosystem.  These are discussed below. 
Trigger trades:  At its simplest, algorithms can be employed in ways to 
execute limit orders once basic thresholds are met.125  A trade trigger is 
usually a market condition or a specified event, such as a rise or fall in the 
price of a security.  “For an investor looking to buy Public Company shares 
at $10 dollars [sic] a share, an algorithm observes the market and sends a 
purchase order as soon as the price reaches this figure.”126 
Trigger trades represent profit-making opportunities in several ways.  To 
the extent to which a trader is first to pull the trigger, his or her trade is 
more likely to be executed and executed before other traders can adjust 
prices in response.  Thus, fast execution can help enable trades of even 
large blocks without distorting the price in ways that severely disadvantage 
the trader pulling the trigger.  Equally important, speed helps avoid the cost 
of trade latency—namely the risk that the price of a security will rise before 
an order can be made or that an offer or bid could be revoked before 
securing an agreement.  Finally, and most controversially, speed can enable 
a trader to purchase and then resell a security at a higher price to 
institutional investors trying to unload large blocks of securities. 
Statistical arbitrageurs:  More complex strategies involve leveraging 
mathematical formulas and past historical data to identify mispricing of 
stocks as they relate to one another.  If, for example, two stocks in the same 
sector tend to track one another closely, and if the spread between the two 
falls out of historical means, a trader could program a computer to trade on 
the under- or overpriced security, acting on the assumption that the 
historical correlation is likely to continue and a reversion to the relationship 
between the securities will occur. 
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To hide trades, new cloaking algo strategies were devised whereby 
trades, especially buy orders, were broken up into their constituent pieces to 
mask intentions to purchase large numbers of stock.127  Randomizing trade 
strategies also were introduced to shift unexpectedly and adopt different 
trade strategies to protect trades and help ensure best execution.  To counter 
these strategies, counterparties developed ever more complex order 
awareness algos to detect trading strategies and hunt large market orders 
like hunters following their prey.  Once momentum or trading patterns were 
detected, trigger trades would be executed in milliseconds to beat their 
competition to the punch. 
Execution arbitrage (the “size game” algorithm):  Algorithms were used 
to game order execution rules of the venues in which they operated.  The 
idea behind the algorithms was simple, even if the math was not.  It also can 
be demonstrated best by example.  In the early 1990s, certain exchanges 
were giving priority to firms that placed large orders, regardless of whether 
they were ever executed.128  With this in mind, several twenty-something 
traders developed various algorithm programs, the most famous being the 
“Monster Key,” to send artificially inflated orders in order to get priority 
and leap in front of the queue to match orders.129  By engaging in this risky, 
albeit statistically sophisticated, manner of trading, traders could make a 
ridiculous offer and still get the best price.  This strategy, once discovered, 
was then mimicked by others with names like “Bombs,” “Superbombs,” 
“Guerillas,” “Stealths,” and “Snipers,” all to exploit the rules established by 
the venues to increase the likelihood of execution.130 
B.  Private Capital Markets 
Automated trading and execution were not the only developments to 
transform the industry.  Other changes would also roil markets as new 
venues for trading proliferated, often with the help of regulatory 
interventions.  Namely, not only would securities be traded on more 
markets outside the traditional exchange infrastructure, but a secondary 
market for private placements would also be established. 
1.  Alternative Trading Venues 
The impact of technology on the environment for securities issuances and 
trading proved, after a period of initial gestation and experimentation 
among market participants, to be profound.  As the following sections 
indicate, engineers and programmers developed new platforms to 
accommodate electronic trading systems.  New regulatory guidelines, 
meanwhile, incentivized, and in some instances necessitated, greater 
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computerization and specialization with regard to services intermediaries 
provided. 
a.  From Island to Archipelago 
The biggest limitation of artificial intelligence (AI) was that it did not 
always jive well with human intelligence.  Human beings—in all their 
irrationality, impulsiveness, greed, and fear—were unpredictable and thus 
did not interact well with computers, even though people programmed 
them.131  Unlike computers, human beings made plenty of mistakes 
inputting and executing orders, “upsetting the rigid computer-driven 
systems, which depended on precise order.”132 
This was a huge problem for early adopters of technology throughout the 
1990s.  Even with the incremental creation of electronic platforms and 
trading systems, humans were still very much at the heart of trading.  On 
the NYSE, which dominated trading of blue-chip stocks such as IBM and 
GE through floor specialists who monopolized the trading of a security, and 
even on the NASDAQ, where roughly five hundred market makers 
competed to offer the most attractive bids and offers of other stocks, trading 
was for the most part done manually.  A change was thus needed in the 
form of new, sanitized markets to connect electronic (algorithmic) traders 
and develop a new market ecosystem free of human interference. 
To accommodate this demand, engineers and financiers began to develop 
platforms to connect computerized trading systems.  It was not an entirely 
novel project.  As Part II.A explained, since the mid-1980s, systems had 
been in development to connect traders of small volumes directly to the 
market.  During this period, traders themselves recognized the advantages 
(and profits) that could come from supercharging trading speeds.  
Eventually, however, some of the most popular programs, specifically the 
Watcher, began to generate sufficient volume, and operators recognized that 
a valuable service could be made matching orders coming into their 
system.133  That way, buy and sell orders could be connected internally and 
thus avoid the commissions charged by the market makers on exchanges. 
One of the most successful Datek traders, and creator of the Watcher, 
designed a system where users could trade directly between themselves 
without interacting with a market maker.134  From this system, the 
electronic communication network (ECN) that would be known as “Island” 
was launched in 1996.135  Island was innovative insofar as traders could 
subscribe to their services and receive information on stocks through an 
electronic feed.  To promote the process and encourage trading, once trades 
were booked, they were reported to the consolidated tape—a program 
providing constantly updated information on trading volume and prices—
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and then published for free on the Island website using a program called 
Bookviewer.136  In providing the service, Island became known as one of 
the first “lit” alternative trading venues for securities trading.137  Without 
having to rely on humans for processing all aspects of their orders 
manually, Island would set the stage for algorithmic trading to later grow, 
adapt, mutate, and evolve. 
During the same decade, a company known as “Instinet” would also 
create a market-leading ECN.138  This ECN hosted entirely anonymous 
trading among institutional investors and was facilitated through Instinet 
hardware.  Traders had to rent the computer for a modest fee of about 
$1000 a month, and their firms needed to pass through a credit committee 
that essentially only allowed the largest, most wealthy players to 
participate.139  Computers would display buy and sell orders, though trades 
were not reported to the public until after they were completed.  Equally 
“[i]mportant, the matching process wasn’t automated.  Living, breathing 
Instinet traders sitting at desks in Instinet’s midtown Manhattan 
headquarters did the actual grunt work of bringing the buy and sell orders 
together and settling the deal, usually through a few quick phone calls with 
the institutions themselves.”140 
Between the two, “Island quickly gained a reputation as having one of 
the fastest ‘matching engines’—the computer system that links together buy 
and sell orders—on Wall Street.”141  Almost immediately, more traders 
began to migrate to its system, and as its popularity grew and more 
transactions were consummated on its platform, it started taking market 
share away from NSADAQ itself.142 
With Island’s dominance, competitors regrouped to knock the firm off its 
perch.  One former SOES trader in particular, Jerry Putnam, recognized that 
a potentially successful strategy to challenge Island would be to create an 
ECN where trades were first routed there, and then if there was no match—
due to limited liquidity—a software program driven by advanced AI 
infrastructure would assess the market and route the trade for its best match 
elsewhere.143  From this pathbreaking idea, the “smart order router,” a 
computerized system that watches and surveys the rest of the market for 
trade matches, was born.144  In short, a new kind of network was 
envisioned, one that could link “islands” of liquidity together:  an 
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“archipelago” of markets.  In 1997, Putnam launched the Archipelago 
ECN.145 
Archipelago prospered and grew with the help of investment banks like 
Goldman Sachs who were actively funneling orders into its system.146  The 
firm’s savvy move to link pools of liquidity provided new levels of 
assurance that orders could and would be executed.  Island, too, continued 
to eat into NASDAQ’s market share as a steady flow of traders began 
entering the market on the heels of the internet bubble.147  By 1998, Island 
managed to capture one-tenth of the volume of all NASDAQ stocks and 
had established itself as the top NASDAQ dealer of premium internet 
stocks, such as Yahoo! and Amazon.148 
b.  Order Handling and Decimalization 
Yet the major drivers of ECN growth came not only from technological 
innovation, but from novel rulemaking as well.  By 1997, evidence had 
been presented showing that market makers ignored odd-eighth quotes.149  
That is, instead of making bids in one-eighth increments, dealers quoted 
prices in one-half or three-quarter increments, suggesting a coordinated 
attempt to keep the bid-ask spread wide (and earn outsized profits).150  In 
response to the scandal, which belied considerable market manipulation, in 
1997 the SEC passed new “Order Handling Rules” that required exchange 
specialists and OTC market makers to publicly display customer limit 
orders (again, orders to buy or sell at a specific price) when the orders were 
better than the quotes offered by the specialist or market maker.151  In that 
way, the investing public could compete directly in the price discovery 
process and for transactions.  Specialists and market makers could still trade 
at better prices in the ECNs without publishing an improved quote, but the 
ECN would have to eventually publish the improved prices and make them 
available to the investing public. 
The idea behind the rules, which in many respects created the legal 
category of an ECN, was in part to bring Instinet trades to the light.  But it 
had the side effect of essentially mandating that bids and offers for stocks 
on ECNs be displayed on terminals right beside those of the NASDAQ 
market makers.152  By opening up the market in this way, the playing field 
for the entire secondary market was leveled.  Electronic systems like Island 
could suddenly compete head-to-head with investment banks and the 
exchanges.  And large dealers like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
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now had to keep apprised of ECN markets as the dealer choke hold over 
order flow was cracked.153  Technology became critical for processing the 
data, and home-based systems were quickly being replaced by screen-based 
networks.154  Concomitantly, AI was used not only to execute but also to 
drive the trading process forward. 
At the same time, the SEC regulated the new market venues with a 
markedly light touch.  Although ECNs were poised to grow in importance, 
they were not regulated as exchanges.  Instead, under Regulation ATS155 
and Rule 3b-18,156 they could avoid registration with the Commission, as 
well as the securities registration requirements, self-regulatory obligations, 
and other restrictions on institutional members’ exchange registration.157  
The primary condition was that they were operated by a broker-dealer, were 
not the dominant market for the trading of the security, and did not use the 
word “exchange” in their name.158 
Another catalyst driving electronic trading forward came in 2000 with 
“decimalization,” which required that stocks be traded in penny increments 
instead of fractions of a dollar.159  With decimalization, stocks could trade 
in more diverse increments, generating more computational complexity 
better tackled by computers than the human brain.160  Moreover, penny 
increments sliced prevailing bid-ask spreads, forcing many established 
market makers to close shop—and opening up opportunities for hyper-
efficient, high-speed firms that could do more work and handle greater 
volumes to stay in the black.161 
Arguably the most important development arose when Rule 390 was 
repealed.  As noted in the discussion above, Rule 390 prevented NYSE-
listed companies from engaging in off-floor transactions.162  In 2001, 
however, after a series of public criticisms by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, 
the rule was effectively dismantled, and stocks listed on the NYSE, regional 
exchanges, and the Chicago Board Options exchange were freely tradable 
in the OTC markets.163  This in turn released enormous pressure on the 
NYSE to compete with other more technologically advanced trading venues 
that could—and did—appeal to traders and nonmembers.164 
Collectively, these developments reshaped the industry of exchange 
trading as exchanges’ market share decreased alongside commissions.  The 
competition eventually forced exchanges to adapt for the sake of their own 
survival.  The most dramatic move came in 2005.  On April 20, John Thain, 
 
 153. PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 128. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Colby & Sirri, supra note 95, at 183–84. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. at 184–85. 
 160. See Patterson, supra note 141. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Colby & Sirri, supra note 95, at 181. 
 163. See id. at 176 n.13. 
 164. See KIM, supra note 127, at 46–47. 
1008 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
the CEO of the NYSE, announced alongside archrival Archipelago CEO 
Putnam that the two firms would merge and that the new exchange would 
promote a hybrid market that integrated into one platform both an auction 
and automated market.165  Additionally, the firm would be publicly traded, 
instead of member owned.166  By merging, it was hoped that the NYSE 
would win front-end technology, an experienced staff capable of running it, 
and entrepreneurial management.167  Public ownership offering would 
meanwhile focus the firm on becoming as competitive and useful for traders 
and investors as for the exchange members who traditionally manipulated 
its rules for their benefit.  Two days later, on April 22, 2005, NASDAQ 
announced a definitive agreement to purchase another large ECN, Instinet 
Group Incorporated, and in the process acquire Inet—a large ECN that 
traded 25 percent of the NASDAQ listed volume daily—and use its 
technology to help save costs and upgrade its systems.168  Between the two 
transactions, the matching engine at NASDAQ became essentially the same 
one created in the early 1990s by early SOES traders, just as the NYSE’s 
platform was that of the ECN Arca.169 
c.  Regulation NMS 
Inevitably, one outcome of the technological one-upmanship was market 
specialization as ECNs began to proliferate.  Some catered to high 
frequency traders and provided an ideal environment for them to weave in 
and out of their markets—and thus boasted high levels of liquidity.  Others, 
in contrast, would eventually seek to replicate and build off of Instinet’s 
attempts to create high frequency trading (HFT)—free, anonymous “dark 
pools” of capital.  The idea was that, by shifting trades into the shadows, 
they could allow institutional investors to trade large blocks of stocks 
without moving the market.170  Meanwhile, established exchanges began to 
fight more deliberately for order flow by upgrading their platforms and 
changing the business models that had guided them for over two hundred 
years. 
Not surprisingly, however, with competition, trading became 
decentralized and fewer market participants coalesced around the same 
venues to trade.  This development in turn created market fragmentation, to 
the consternation of many policymakers and market participants.  For one, 
regulators and economists began to worry that with fewer market 
participants interacting with one another in any one particular place, prices 
would respond more slowly to new information, creating longer periods in 
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which market prices were out of alignment with their “real” equilibrium 
price.171  It also meant that infrastructure providers might not route trades to 
the venues that offered the best execution.  Fragmentation also enabled a 
free rider problem to the extent that market participants operating via ECNs 
executed trades based on the market price generated and displayed by lit 
public venues.172  Because publicly generated information often fueled 
trading, ECNs’ business models relied at least in part on participants 
skimming the price information generated (and subsidized) by exchanges, 
though exchanges were not compensated for the information they 
generated. 
With these concerns in mind, the SEC promulgated Regulation NMS in 
2007 to better coordinate markets.173  Under the regulation, any investor’s 
instructions to buy or sell a stock had to be diverted to the venue that 
displayed the best price.174  If an investor placed a limit order to buy 
Twitter on the NASDAQ, where it was selling for $41.22, and the 
investor’s broker, a NASDAQ market maker, discovered there was a better 
price on Archipelago for $42, then he had to be routed to Archipelago. 
Though the rules made intuitive sense, they unleashed yet another series 
of new pressures to ensure technological competitiveness.  One element of 
the rule, the so-called trade-through rule, allowed firms to trade through 
human-controlled manual markets if they were too slow in processing 
orders.175  Furthermore, trading venues would have to constantly monitor 
the price of the stock on every trading venue, all the time, a feat beyond the 
capacity of the mind.176  Together, these new developments would make 
the use of industrial-strength computerized trading and execution a practical 
necessity.177 
But there were also a number of complications.  Because prices were still 
the dominant component of trading decisions, any fluctuation in prices, no 
matter how minuscule, could result in an order being rejected or diverted to 
another venue.  Or a firm could find itself with what it thought was a highly 
competitive bid one minute, and kicked to the back of the queue of 
incoming orders the next.178  This raised risks of bad execution for HFTs, 
now the dominant source of liquidity, and could undermine the 
attractiveness of venues seeking their business. 
Some venues responded to their technology-wielding (and fee-
generating) customers by, among other things, rolling out new order types 
called “sitting duck limit orders” that allowed high-frequency traders who 
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posted orders to remain hidden at a specific price point at the front of the 
trading line when the market was moving.179  Through the orders, traders 
could sideline typical limit orders made by slower institutional investors 
like mutual funds and pensions.  And to sweeten the incentives to trade, 
they created rules allowing HFTs to make other firms pay a “take” fee for 
using the liquidity they were “making.”  Thus, in providing the special 
orders for privileged traders, exchanges were allowing, and even helping, 
firms circumvent Regulation NMS by creating a secret “dark pool inside the 
lit pool.”180  Meanwhile, other ECNs resorted to slashing their commissions 
with the result that their bottom line would take a direct hit—all with the 
goal of becoming more attractive for a host of new competitors coming of 
age in the wake of the order-handling rules like BRUT, Sigma X, and B-
Trade.181 
Through such episodic forms, the SEC’s Regulation NMS, when 
combined with the order-handling rules and regulation alternative trading 
systems (ATS), facilitated a patchwork of regulations aimed at balancing 
competition and price discovery.  Exchanges, significant OTC market 
makers, and ATS with more than 5 percent of the volume in a security 
would have to display their best bid and offers; broker-dealers would also 
have to report all trades, block or non-block, within thirty seconds.182  
Trading centers additionally had to publish statistics to show what quality 
of markets they were providing training centers and were prohibited from 
trading at inferior prices to the best quote published by other electronic 
trading centers.183  Meanwhile, broker-dealers were subject to increasingly 
stringent best execution requirements and obligated to disclose which 
trading centers they used to route their orders.184 
The market impact was, and continues to be, dramatic.  As discussed 
above, all U.S. exchanges have become primarily electronic, a development 
that has boosted trading volume and is squeezing commissions on a per 
trade basis.  At the same time, the fragmentation has given traders an 
expanded array of venues as to where and how to execute their trades, a 
topic this Article returns to below.  Suffice it to say, for the moment, not 
only have electronic traders found and identified ecosystems that have 
suited their infrastructure needs, but institutional investors themselves also 
have used the fragmented ecosystem to execute even large trades in ways 
that do not necessarily move markets by filling them in smaller venues 
where quotes are not required to be published. 
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2.  Rule 144A Trading Platforms 
Many of the brokerages that had been participating in the migration away 
from exchanges realized that similar opportunities potentially existed in the 
private placement market.  Just as algo traders needed private, volume-rich 
markets to sell and interact, issuers of securities increasingly sought pools 
of liquidity for their stocks and bonds where institutional traders could 
meet, off exchange, in order to avoid triggering Exchange Act reporting 
obligations. 
The prospect of a secondary market for private placements was not novel, 
but was nonetheless riveting.  As mentioned above in Part I, the broadest 
exemption to the section 5 registration requirement was section 4(2), which 
exempted transactions “not involving any public offering.”185  But at the 
time of the New Deal, and for decades following it, just what was required 
to meet that threshold was ambiguous,186 and if for whatever reason an 
issuer failed to comply with all the dictates of section 4(2), they would find 
themselves faced with rescission liability under section 12 of the Exchange 
Act.  Only in the course of nearly forty years of case law, which worked to 
articulate standards for private placements, and the promulgation of 
Regulation D in 1982, which sculpted out three relatively clear paths for 
avoiding exemption under the Securities Act,187 was sufficient comfort 
made available to incentivize issuers to expend more time investigating the 
prospects of nonpublic offerings. 
Yet even then, more legal reforms were needed to facilitate a secondary 
market.  The beauty of Regulation D was that it opened up a number of 
ways for companies to raise capital without going public.  Rule 504, for 
example, permits general solicitations and unregistered offerings up to $1 
million,188 and Rule 505 enabled fundraisings of $5 million, though 
prohibited public marketing.189  Most critical, however, was Rule 506, 
which opened a pathway for companies to issue an unlimited amount of 
securities to “accredited investors”—essentially investors earning more than 
$200,000 a year or with a net worth greater than $1 million—so long as 
they did not market the transaction to the public.190  But there were still 
plenty of regulatory hurdles.  Investors could invest in private securities, 
though they could not legally resell them without risking running afoul of 
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section 4(2) and likewise violating the Securities Act.  As with the original 
section 4(2) exemptions, various means of reselling were often ambiguous 
and required cobbling together doctrines from the Securities Act in ways 
that were not always clear and thus raised concerns among institutions.  The 
cost of raising capital under private placements was therefore still high 
since securities that were issued, even under Regulation D, were for the 
most part immobile and traded only with considerable difficulty. 
The real revolution came about with Rule 144A in 1994, which would 
liberalize trading by institutional investors (referred to as “qualified 
institutional buyers” or “QIBs”) of securities that were privately placed.191  
Specifically, Rule 144A would enable securities acquired pursuant to 
Regulation D (or other Rule 144A transactions) to be sold to other 
institutions (generally with $10 million under management) with no holding 
period imposed and minimal disclosure requirements.192 
Even today, the impact of Rule 144A is hard to overstate.  For the half 
century following the Exchange Act and well past the promulgation of 
Regulation D, the trading of private placements—to the extent to which it 
was even possible given what had been lengthy holding periods and legal 
risk when the “restricted securities” were traded—had been facilitated like 
any other over-the-counter securities—via a network of brokers and dealers 
reliant on phone lines, gossip, and hot tips.  Rule 144A would change this 
significantly.  Although issuances would still lack the market infrastructure 
found in public markets, Rule 144A would reshape capital markets by 
enabling more flexible fundraising and trading capabilities for institutional 
investors.  Firms could raise capital, free of most substantive requirements 
(though notably Rule 10b-5 antifraud provisions would still be in effect), 
and sell their securities to well-heeled institutional investors.  Institutional 
investors, meanwhile, could then trade the securities among one another.  
With channels now wide open, capital markets would be reshaped.  Indeed, 
by 2006, America raised more money, $162 billion, from private investors 
than from IPOs, from which $154 billion was raised from the three major 
stock exchanges at the time. 
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Figure 1193 
 
The only thing missing was a platform for connecting buyers and sellers 
of privately placed securities—in short, an off-exchange venue where the 
purchase and sale of private securities could coalesce without triggering 
registration requirements and the quarterly and annual disclosure 
requirements that accompanied it.  With this in mind, in 2007, at the height 
of the housing bubble and the 144A market, several companies entered the 
race to create a private exchange for private placements.  In 2007, Goldman 
Sachs started its own marketplace naming it “the Goldman Sachs Tradable 
Unregistered Equity platform,” or GSTrUE.194  The idea, as Lloyd C. 
Blankfein, the Goldman CEO, would argue, was to bring “the liquidity of 
an exchange with the flexibility of a private placement.”195  The venture 
would attract, most spectacularly, Oaktree Management and Apollo Global 
Management, which both raised over $700 million on the network.196 
Similarly, the NASDAQ exchange also entered the fray with a new 
platform, called “the Portal Market,” and planned to host nearly 500 
different firms on its network.197  Major investment banks, including 
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Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup began to set up their own 
competing exchanges.  With Portal in particular, which would be the largest 
venue, investors would be able to log on to a secure website to access data 
relating to the firms and then trade shares on a secure server.  Prices, as on 
any other electronic communications network, could then be updated 
automatically. 
There was, however, one enormous stumbling block:  an absence of 
people interested in trading on the private exchanges.  Investors who 
purchased shares of Apollo and Oaktree on GSTrUE “found few, if any, 
buyers, for their stock when they wanted to sell.”198  Part of GSTrUE’s 
woes stemmed from the problem that credit markets froze up at the same 
time the platform was launched.  Then, as Lehman failed, the financial 
crisis gripped global markets, and “investors became allergic to any 
investment where liquidity was an issue.”199  As a result, investors in 
Apollo and Oaktree suffered steep losses as shares changed hands only at a 
“steep discount to their true value.”200  Eventually, GSTrUE and all of the 
first-generation firms vying to run private exchanges closed shop. 
The retreat, however, proved only to be a tactical one.  Eight years later, 
engineers were busy trying to think through a more palatable platform for 
the post-recession environment.  One firm, SecondMarket, which was 
originally founded in 2004 to create a liquidity platform for restricted 
securities, diversified its business strategy in the wake of the crisis to also 
service liquidity needs of distressed or illiquid assets including bankruptcy 
claims, limited partnership interests, structured products (MBS, CDO, 
ABS), and Bitcoin.201 
Then, more spectacularly in 2013, NASDAQ (now called NASDAQ 
OMX) reentered the 144A market alongside SharesPost—a firm that 
allowed investors to swap shares of private companies for cash—to launch 
a new marketplace for trading shares in privately held companies.202  As 
was the case a decade earlier with Portal, part of the venture’s appeal was 
allowing investors to buy into young and promising capital-hungry firms.  
But this time, instead of developing its platform by itself, NASDAQ 
leveraged SharesPost’s website, technology, and relationships with Silicon 
Valley to launch a joint venture. 
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Business strategies are continuously changing as well.203  In contrast to 
Portal, the joint venture reportedly offered companies a greater degree of 
authority over a range of offering-related matters, even as they pertain to 
the secondary market:  “who can buy and sell, how much equity and cash 
changes hands, and even the timing of trades”—a feature that competitor 
SecondMarket has similarly imported into its own growing platform.204  In 
that way, listing companies will enjoy more comfort as to the ownership of 
their shares and will be able to more effectively craft appropriate market 
signals to accredited investors and QIBs about their securities.  Meanwhile, 
to reduce the likely considerable impact such restrictions would have on the 
liquidity of private issuances, the leveraging of a website instead of a 
closed-end platform potentially allows issuers to utilize new JOBS Act205 
reforms (elaborated in the following section) to generally solicit investors to 
create a larger funding base.  If successful, the new market could create a 
self-sustaining secondary exchange for smaller, entrepreneurial companies, 
or a bridge for early stage companies that might eventually list on a major 
exchange.  The prospect of such an account has indeed only increased with 
an announcement by NASDAQ in October 2015 of its intent to purchase 
the company.206 
3.  From Crowdfunding to Crowd Investing 
The same JOBS Act that provided the legal basis for expanding the 144A 
market also had an important impact on crowdfunding and triggered an 
explosion in web-based innovation and financial products for the young 
sector. 
The definition of “crowdfunding” has been subject to some dispute, but 
traditionally the term has referred to methods by which entrepreneurs 
collect small contributions via an online interface to finance or capitalize 
their ventures.207  As a financing venture, its origins lie as much in banking 
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as they do in securities.  In 1976, Muhammad Yunus lent $27 to forty-two 
women to make bamboo furniture.208  The idea was to create new 
opportunities for the poor by giving entrepreneurs access to banking 
services and products that had until that time been foreclosed to them.209  
After recuperating his capital, and demonstrating the safety of mini-loans to 
the poor, Yunus secured capital from central banks and foundations to 
extend the project to others.210  Within five years, the program had over 
30,000 members, from which the Nobel Prize-winning Grameen Bank was 
born.211 
The revolution in what would be called “microlending” or 
“microfinance” met the internet age three decades later.  In 2005, Kiva.org 
launched the first microlending website.212  By uploading profiles and 
pictures of potential loan recipients, it globalized Yunus’s original concept.  
It also reduced the informational asymmetries that naturally accompanied 
global finance.  Lenders could identify (often personally) with borrowers, 
consider their business plan, and evaluate repayment in real time.  In this 
way, finance operated via increasingly commonplace social media 
technology—which required far less expertise and coding than the ECNs 
and dark pools required to facilitate HFT—to generate interest in small-
scale entrepreneurial activities taking place all over the world.213  The 
concept was quickly replicated in 2006, when Prosper.com launched the 
first peer-to-peer lending site in the United States and took the 
unprecedented step of offering loans, often below bank rates, to 
entrepreneurs not in only developing countries, but in the United States as 
well.214 
The evolutionary leap from bank to securities finance arose circuitously.  
In 2009, Kickstarter launched as a new way to fund creativity.215  The 
company, alongside commentator Michael Sullivan, also helped coin the 
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term of “crowdfunding.”216  Taking this concept as part of its brand, 
Kickstarter initiated a means of finance whereby young entrepreneurs 
would receive funding.217  Contributors would not, however, receive cash 
back, much less interest.218  Instead, contributors become eligible for a 
range of “rewards” ranging from video games to apps or whatever else the 
recipient of the funds is making or striving to create.219  Notably, doing so 
allowed participants on the webpage, and especially entrepreneurs, to avoid 
falling within the definition of selling “securities” because contributors 
were not looking for a “profit” in the traditional sense.220  They were not 
entirely altruistic for sure, as they usually received something in return for 
their contributions, but because they were not investing their money for 
capital returns, the transactions fell well outside of the traditional meaning 
of a security (or, more relevantly, an “investment contract”) as defined 
under U.S. case law.221  Because there were no dealings in securities, 
section 5 could not apply. 
The prospect of securities-based crowdfunding was, however, of 
increasing interest to both Wall Street and entrepreneurs.  In short, the 
technology that enabled peer-to-peer (donation-based) lending could be a 
powerful tool for enabling securities transactions as well.  In that way, 
people could be free to donate, or seek perks, but they also could invest in 
early-stage ventures. 
Several important roadblocks, however, were in the way.  Most notably, 
once traditional securities transactions were married with internet 
technology, investors would be seeking “profits” and, by extension, capital 
returns, thus triggering section 5.  Consequently, they would be subject to 
registration and disclosure obligations under the Securities Act222 (and 
subsequent reporting requirements under the Exchange Act223). 
Furthermore, exemptions were of limited help.  Regulation D and Rule 
144A were of little use on the internet as advertisements about securities 
constitute a “general solicitation”—which was banned for private 
placements (and the reason why much of the activity had been routed to 
 
 216. See Daniela Castrataro, A Social History of Crowdfunding, SOC. MEDIA WK. (Dec. 
12, 2011), http://socialmediaweek.org/blog/2011/12/a-social-history-of-crowdfunding/ 
[http://perma.cc/6YSP-K8XS]. 
 217. See Chance Barnett, Donation-Based Crowdfunding Sites:  Kickstarter Vs. 
Indiegogo, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/ 
2013/09/09/donation-based-crowdfunding-sites-kickstarter-vs-indiegogo/ [http://perma.cc/ 
XCB6-YKJS]. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (defining an investment contract 
to comprise an investment of money, with an expectation of profits arising from a common 
enterprise which depends solely on the efforts of others to determine if an investment is a 
security). 
 222. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)–(mm) (2012). 
 223. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)–(kk). 
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brokerages and private exchanges).224  Instead, several websites, beginning 
with AngelList in 2010, developed exclusive, closed-end accredited 
investor websites that allowed qualifying investors to invest capital 
alongside prominent angel investors in capital-hungry startups.225  As such, 
however, AngelList’s reach was far more circumscribed than Prosper’s or 
Kickstarter’s.  These web applications presented, above all else, 
administrative ease and a user-friendly experience for investors seeking to 
put capital toward attractive early-stage companies.  Moreover, from the 
standpoint of many crowdfunding champions, even successful 144A 
issuances had the impact of locking out the retail public from opportunities 
to invest in early-stage companies. 
Ultimately, regulatory reform, not technology, provided the most radical 
potential for reshaping the sector.  In the wake of a failing banking system 
and plummeting interbank lending, President Barack Obama signed the 
JOBS Act into law to increase sources of finance for young businesses.226  
Its implications were significant across private markets, which this Article 
returns to below, but three in particular promise to hold an enormous impact 
on the crowdfunding sector in particular. 
The JOBS Act is best known for Title III.227  Under the rules laid out in 
the legislation, individuals are no longer constrained to the donation-based 
crowdfunding models like Kickstarter and Indiegogo.228  Instead, 
congressional reforms authorized, and subsequent SEC rules proposed, that 
a company could raise up to $1 million within a twelve-month period from 
the general public through a website overseen by a broker-dealer or a lightly 
regulated website called a “funding portal.”229  Investors, meanwhile, are 
subject to annual investment caps based on their income or wealth, and 
there are investor education requirements, as well as limits on general 
advertising.230  Via these reforms, the U.S. Congress opened the door to 
build out a new technological gateway for investing, built not so much on 
traditional investor protections of disclosure, but instead on prudential 
 
 224. Definitions and Terms Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2012); Private 
Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2014). 
 225. See Brad Stone, AngelList, the Social Network for Startups, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 
16, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-16/angellist-the-social-network-
for-startups [http://perma.cc/9B4U-ECDK]; cf. Tanya Prive, Angel Investors:  How the Rich 
Invest, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
tanyaprive/2013/03/12/angels-investors-how-the-rich-invest/ (discussing generally angel 
investors) [http://perma.cc/RU3C-EADU]. 
 226. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 227. See id. §§ 301–05; Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
 228. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. 
 229. See Noam Noked, Regulation A+ Offerings—A New Era at the SEC, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. oN CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2014/01/15/regulation-a-offerings-a-new-era-at-the-sec/ [http://perma.cc/4DSB-5V 
9D]. 
 230. See Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act Isn’t All “Crowdfunding”, 
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobs-
act-isnt-all-crowdfunding/ [http://perma.cc/VG6Q-J889]. 
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limitations on the amount of exposure to which any investor could be 
exposed. 
That said, arguably the most important role for crowd investing writ large 
is Title II of the JOBS Act.231  This second part of the JOBS Act lifted the 
ban for general solicitations under Rule 505 and 506 transactions so long as 
the issuer reasonably believes, and has taken reasonable steps to verify that, 
the buyers of the private securities are accredited.232  Through these 
reforms, Congress not only enabled the growth of 144A issuances as a 
general matter by removing a major impediment to their marketing of 144A 
securities, but also encouraged the growth of web-based marketing and 
social media campaigns through portals and (even more likely) registered 
broker-dealers.  Not surprisingly, the rules themselves have unleashed a 
range of innovation among web service providers that offer data-
verification programs for administrators of 144A campaigns to ensure high 
quality disclosures and appropriate investor accreditation.233 
A third and closely related set of reforms is Title IV, commonly known 
as “the Regulation A+ reforms.”234  In this title, an earlier exemption for 
securities offerings, Regulation A, has been revamped to become more 
attractive to issuers.  Regulation A’s “mini-registration” process permitted 
the sale of securities to both accredited and unaccredited investors so long 
as the issuer filed a mini-registration with the SEC and complied with 
relevant state law requirements in each state where funds were solicited.  
But it was of limited use as only $5 million could be raised, and the process 
still involved both unclear and costly compliance procedures with varying 
securities regulators.  Few if any issuers besides Fundrise, a real estate firm, 
used this exemption to raise money from investors in Washington, D.C., 
and Virginia for a local commercial real estate project.235  Title IV of the 
JOBS Act, which increases the offering limit from $5 million to up to $50 
 
 231. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012); Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242); Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 44,806 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239); Eliminating the 
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 
144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464 (Sept. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 
239). 
 232. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,772 (July 4, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242). 
 233. Crowdcheck, for example, helps platforms comply with investor protection 
obligations by providing investors with clear and easy to understand information about the 
companies on online platforms. See About Us, CROWDCHECK, http://www.crowdcheck.com/ 
about-us (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/4GTZ-5Z6G]. 
 234. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 401–02 (adding § 3(b)(2)(D) to the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012)). 
 235. See The Fundrise Story, FUNDRISE, https://fundrise.com/about?source=main-menu# 
story (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/PN7T-W2YH]. 
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million in a twelve-month period, requires that certain filings be provided to 
investors and provides for annual audited financial statements.236 
III.  HOW TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTS REGULATORY PRACTICE 
The technological innovation described above, though arising in diverse 
market contexts, has three important implications for the practice of 
securities regulation:  First, technological innovation is increasingly 
disintermediating public companies, and the need to go public, for 
financing purposes.  Second, exchanges are finding themselves increasingly 
pushed to the side as venues for secondary trading and even listing.  Finally, 
and more complexly, the traditional dominance of exchange-based broker-
dealers, like specialists and floor brokers, has given way to a new breed of 
financial intermediaries that increasingly provide both venues and liquidity 
for securities trading.  In each case, the disruption of regulatory practice, 
while potentially improving prospects for capital formation and liquidity, 
presents novel questions of market integrity and, more fundamentally, 
fairness. 
A.  Disintermediation of Public Companies 
Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of the technological 
innovations achieved over the last decade has been the decreasing 
importance of section 5—another way of saying that the public offering 
process itself has become less important, or at least more optional.  
Technology, in short, has itself enabled a kind of regulatory arbitrage 
insofar as engineers and bankers have worked diligently to create market 
infrastructures that have made it easier for companies to avoid, or at least 
delay, public offerings and to access private capital.  For leading 
commentators, including professors Bob Thompson and Donald 
Langevoort, this has helped usher in the “death” of section 5 altogether.237 
The modus operandi for this important development has primarily been 
the 144A market.  To understand why, it is useful to remember that, like 
any capital market, a private placement market requires two things in order 
to be viable and competitive:  (1) buyers of the securities (institutional 
investors), and (2) a functioning secondary market (e.g., a connected 
marketplace).  Technology has helped foster the conditions for both.  On 
the one hand, technology has allowed investors to organize themselves as 
“institutions” and aggregate their savings and wealth in ways that ever more 
easily pass the $100 million under management threshold for qualifying as 
 
 236. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 401–02.  Under Tier 1, issuers are 
permitted to raise $20 million in a twelve-month period, though subject to state rules and 
regulations; meanwhile, under Tier 2, issuers are permitted to raise $50 million, and enjoy 
federal preemption, though offerings are subject to more onerous investment limits and 
disclosure obligations. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). 
 237. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 6; see also Robert B. Thompson & Donald 
C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital 
Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1604–24 (2013) (examining the general expansion of 
alternative IPO-fundraising avenues for startups). 
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a QIB.238  Furthermore, brokers no longer need to search their client lists to 
decide who is interested in investing and creating funds.  With internet-
based intermediaries like AngelList, financial firms can instead engage 
more potential investors of varying wealth bases online in the promotion of 
their investment advisory or brokerage services.  Additionally, the back-
office maintenance of these relationships has been made easier with 
computer programming and the web. 
Just as importantly, technology is enabling experimentation and the 
development of a more vibrant 144A secondary market.  ECNs and 
accredited investor websites are providing a basis for both engaging 
qualified investors and connecting them to one another and to early-stage 
(and more mature) investments.239  In doing so, the internet is providing an 
“inexpensive professional-quality connection to the market,” while also 
lowering the cost of capital by reducing the perceived risk of 
investments.240  With more information available relating to investments 
and their managers on the web, and as prospects for a post-issuance 
aftermarket have improved, 144A securities have increased dramatically 
over the last two decades, as have IPOs in foreign jurisdictions on largely 
electronic exchanges.241 
But on the other hand, and even more so than the case of the 
disintermediation of exchanges and broker-dealers described in the 
subsequent two sections, we see that the rise of the private placement 
market, and its encroachment on public offerings, is very much a marriage 
of both technological innovation and regulatory reforms.  That is, law has 
been as important as technology in helping to foster ripe conditions for 
circumventing the public offering process. 
Rulemaking on the public side of the ledger has helped spur the private 
placement market as layers of additional regulatory reporting and corporate 
governance requirements have been loaded onto the section 5 framework.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms of 2002, for example, notably required public 
companies to enhance reporting requirements for financial transactions, 
including off-balance-sheet transactions, pro-forma figures, and stock 
transactions of corporate officers.242  They require internal controls for 
assuring the accuracy of financial reports and disclosures.243  Although 
widely lauded for having increased investor confidence, especially for 
 
 238. See, e.g., Schwieger, supra note 197, at 896 (summarizing requirements for QIBs). 
 239. See Douglas Price, Direct Access Execution:  ECNs, SOEs, Superdot, and Other 
Methods of Trading, 2 J. HIGH TECH L. 1 (2002) (reviewing SIMIT PATEL, DIRECT ACCESS 
EXECUTION:  ECNS, SOES, SUPERDOT, AND OTHER METHODS OF TRADING (2001)). 
 240. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 209. 
 241. See generally Brummer, supra note 76, at 1438; Coffee, supra note 6 (noting the 
potential information-enhancing benefits provided by the internet); Langevoort, Information 
Technology, supra note 6 (same).  That said, questions persist as to the quality of 
information, even as liquidity risks might be assuaged. See generally Pollman, supra note 6 
(noting potential risks of lack of information, asymmetric information, conflicts of interest, 
and insider trading). 
 242. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 243. See id. § 302(a)(4)(A). 
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foreign companies cross-listed in the United States, compliance costs 
averaged for many companies over $1.5 million in the first years of the 
reforms’ implementation.244  Similarly, the Dodd-Frank reforms in the 
wake of the financial crisis introduced measures including say-on-pay 
requirements for public companies and imposed relationships between 
customers and broker-dealers or investment advisers.245 
Meanwhile on the private side, efforts focused on reducing the costs of 
private placements.  As mentioned above, the original section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act presented only limited paths available for private placement, 
and the parameters of a safe harbor were clouded.246  Forty years later, Rule 
144A provided bright-line rules clarifying how issuers could avoid running 
afoul of section 4(2) and, by extension, provided a regulatory front from 
which technological innovation could create a market infrastructure.247 
 
Figure 2 
 
Since then, both the SEC and legislators have worked assiduously to ease 
the need to go public in the first place.  Along with the other important 
crowd investing provisions of the JOBS Act outlined above, for example, is 
Title V, which raises the threshold on the number of shareholders a 
 
 244. See Schwieger, supra note 197; Adam Pritchard, Facebook, the JOBS Act, and 
Abolishing IPOs, 35 REGULATION 12, 15 (2012) (noting the interest in the JOBS Act at 
reducing the burdens generated by Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 245. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n-1 (2012); Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden 
Parachute Compensation As Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm [http://perma.cc/AD82-8ZS4]. 
 246. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm. 
 247. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2014). 
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company can have before it is subject to Exchange Act reporting 
requirements (e.g., a 10-Q or 10-K).248  Under the earlier rules that were 
updated in 1964 with the adoption of section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, a 
private company could remain private until it reached five hundred 
shareholders.249  Title V changes this limit to two thousand shareholders, or 
five hundred shareholders who are unaccredited.250  In combination with 
Title II of the JOBS Act, which, as discussed above, removes the 
prohibition on general solicitation, this means that many private companies 
will both be able to have more shareholders and solicit investments more 
broadly than at any point in the last half century. 
The practical impetus behind the reforms was to avoid some of the 
pressures that growing technology companies like Microsoft and Facebook 
encountered that pushed them into arguably premature IPOs.  In 1986, 
Microsoft had issued incentive stock to employees, “and because of active 
trading in secondary markets, this stock became widely dispersed.”251  It 
became clear that soon more than five hundred shareholders would own the 
stock.252  With the growing shareholder base, Bill Gates decided to conduct 
a public offering even when he did not need to raise any capital because the 
company would soon be required to comply with Exchange Act disclosure 
and compliance rules anyway.253  Facebook later faced similar challenges 
in 2011 when Goldman Sachs planned to create a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) in order to allow its clients to invest up to $450 million in the 
company.254  The idea was that the SPV would count as one shareholder 
and thus allow the company to avoid reporting obligations.255  The SEC 
frowned on such an approach, and the company was forced to go public—
again at a time when its capital needs were still somewhat modest as 
compared to what it could raise (and did raise) in an IPO.256  The JOBS Act 
served in effect to reduce such pressure via new provisions under Title I 
that facilitated issuances by “emerging growth companies.”257 
 
 248. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 230; Susan Beblavi, JOBS Act Title V:  Raising 
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http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2013/4/27/jobs-act-title-v-raising-the-
threshold-for-registration.html [http://perma.cc/5B8P-NE8P]. 
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 250. See id. 
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Returning then to our original observation, public offerings in the twenty-
first century are even less legally and practically necessary.  This is not, of 
course, to say that they never happen, or even that they do not encounter 
bouts of popularity for companies seeking both to raise large amounts of 
capital and promote their brands and brand awareness.258  That said, 
technology has worked alongside regulatory reforms to make staying 
private easier and private placements more efficient and attractive.  These 
developments contrast considerably with the public offering process, which 
is not only more costly than in the 1930s, but also presents fewer obvious 
comparative advantages.  As a result, the public offering process, and 
indeed public company status, are faced with the uncomfortable prospect of 
becoming increasingly marginalized as private markets and private market 
infrastructure continue to develop in ways that maximize the flexibility of 
recent regulatory reforms. 
B.  Disintermediation of Exchanges 
Accompanying the increasing means of circumventing registration 
requirements have been tools to avoid traditional trading environments.  
This in turn has created new incentives for exchanges and traders alike, as 
well as risks to market integrity. 
1.  A More Diverse Market Ecosystem 
Even more pronounced and rapid than the disintermediation of public 
offerings has been the disintermediation of exchanges as sources of 
liquidity.  From the 1930s through the 1980s, major U.S. exchanges not 
only provided listing services for the most important companies in the 
country, but, as noted above, they were also the primary sites of secondary 
trading.  The network externalities inherent to the trading business were 
inherently difficult to surmount, leading to a natural congregation of capital 
among several leading hubs, with the NYSE at the forefront. 
Technology has upended this dominance.  Massive real estate is no 
longer needed to establish a trading platform.  And human beings are rarely 
physically present or populate trading venues.  Instead, as we have seen, 
traders are automatically connected to a trading platform (often brokers 
operating through a subscription service) through which they indicate their 
willingness to buy or sell units of a security electronically.  These orders are 
then displayed instantaneously, often via the internet, and the decisions to 
execute those trades are made by computers according to preestablished 
algorithms that are themselves relatively inexpensive to devise. 
   
 
 258. This has been especially the case recently where macroeconomic engineering has 
driven markets higher and, with them, market valuations and the potential returns on public 
offerings. 
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Figure 3 
 
All the while, attracting liquidity is much easier than in the past, 
especially the liquidity necessary for secondary trading.  Because investors 
can plug in from thousands of miles away, from the comfort of their own 
homes and offices, electronic venues can create the energized trading 
environment once thought to be the sole province of exchanges and can 
operate continuously, 24/7, as long as the trading system is turned on.259 
Part of the popularity of ECNs in particular is that they offer a wider 
array of services than traditional exchanges.  As seen in the history of 
alternative trading venues, instead of the twentieth-century unitary model of 
exchanges, which relied on liquidity centralization, ECNs position 
themselves to fill different market niches and provide a variety of services 
to traders and institutional investors.260 
But it is worth elaborating that in the process, they operate quite 
differently, according to disparate business models, and thus impact price 
discovery in varying ways.  Some dark pools act as brokers instead of 
dealers.  In this group, traders develop prices based on the midpoint of the 
national best bid and offer (NBBO)—which is the best (lowest) available 
ask price and the best (highest) available bid price to investors when they 
buy and sell securities261—and the volume-weighted average price 
 
 259. See Michael J. Barclay & Terrence Hendershott, Price Discovery and Trading After 
Hours, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 1041, 1044 (2003). 
 260. See Markham & Harty, supra note 1, at 902–07. 
 261. The Consolidated Quotation System gives the NBBO for securities listed on the 
NYSE, while the Unlisted Trading Privileges Quote Data Feed gives the NBBO for 
securities listed on the NASDAQ. 
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(VWAP), a popular trading benchmark firms use for their trades.262  
Crosses are thus established at the agreed upon benchmark and executed 
electronically. 
Commentators routinely include “block-crossing” dark pools, called 
“ITG Posit,” and Liquidnet in this kind of group.263  Liquidnet’s ATS 
system obtains information on a member about its trading intentions via its 
order management system (“indications of interest” or “indications”) and 
then uses that information to look for execution opportunities, or 
“matches,” among members interested in buying and selling the same 
stock.264  If a match of indications is detected, the potential buyer and seller 
are invited to negotiate with each other, anonymously, through the 
Liquidnet system.265  Once the buyer and seller agree on the transaction 
terms, an execution occurs.266  Similarly, ITG Posit crosses large 
institutional orders randomly several times a day, and Instinet operates 
scheduled continuous dark pools with both firms matching buy and sell 
orders electronically for execution without first routing the order to an 
exchange or other displayed market in order to avoid moving the price of 
the security.267 
Meanwhile, other dark pools accept market, limit, or paid orders through 
continuous non-displayed limit order books that are themselves segmented 
from the main exchange.  This group has in the past included many of the 
dark pools owned by major broker-dealers, including Credit Suisse 
Crossfinder, Goldman Sachs Sigma X, Citi Match, Barclays LX, Morgan 
Stanley MS Pool, and UBS PRN.268  Unlike the first group, where the 
NBBO and VWAP generate the basis of prices, execution prices are derived 
from the limit orders submitted by participants.  Price discovery can 
arguably thus take place, though even here the trade sizes are often much 
smaller when compared to their block-size counterparts, and traders can use 
cloaking algorithms, as they do on public exchanges, to split “parent” 
orders into smaller “children” orders across networks to further mask 
trading activities and intentions.269  Dark pools in this group also can 
contain proprietary order flows from the broker-dealers that operate them 
 
 262. VWAP is calculated by adding up the dollars traded for every transaction (price 
multiplied by number of shares traded) and then dividing by the total shares traded for the 
day. See Definition of “Volume Weighted Average Price—VWAP”, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vwap.asp (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ 
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 263. See, e.g., Haoxiang Zhu, Online Appendix of “Do Dark Pools Harm Price 
Discovery?” 3 (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.mit.edu/~zhuh/Zhu_darkpool_online 
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 264. See Liquidnet, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9596, Exchange Act Release No. 
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and thus create quasi-dealer relationships.  Furthermore, transaction prices 
on these platforms are not necessarily calculated from the best bid and offer 
using a transparent rule. 
Finally, a third group comprises entities at times classified as dark pools, 
in which incoming orders are rejected or accepted on fast-moving electronic 
markets.270  These kinds of traders have historically included firms like 
Getco and Knight.  There is no internal matching as they compete for 
business like other market participants.  In contrast with dark pools in the 
other groups discussed above, these HFTs invariably trade on their own 
accounts as principles as opposed to agents or marketplaces, and the fastest 
are periodically considered to be “pools” given the volume of their 
trades.271 
Each kind of actor potentially provides varying advantages vis-à-vis one 
another and exchanges.  Block-size dark pools have the advantage of 
operating in many ways free of opportunistic algorithmic trading but do not 
necessarily offer a continuous trading environment or the kind of 
transparency that reflects the overall market demand for a security.  As with 
the “upstairs” trading at the NYSE, they are not transparent and, given the 
larger size of the institutional orders, may find execution (best or otherwise) 
more difficult because counterparties with equally large positions (and a 
willingness to trade) must be identified.  Other kinds of dark pools 
meanwhile offer a kind of continuous trading environment that mimics the 
flow of liquidity on exchanges and potentially help generate post-trade data 
from exchanges.  That said, as segmented venues, they also impair liquidity 
formation and, with the prevalence of hidden orders, undermine 
informational efficiency as market participants have only incomplete 
information as to the overall depth of the market for securities.  Slower 
traders may also find themselves more vulnerable to faster-paced, 
computer-driven algorithmic players. 
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Dark Pool Trading Mechanisms272 
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Example 
 
 
Key Features 
 
Block Crossing 
System 
Liquidnet, BIDS, 
Instinet Cross 
Large blocks from 
institutional investors 
traded with and 
between one another 
Continuous Cross 
Credit Suisee 
Crossfinder, Goldman 
Sachs Sigma X, 
Barclays LX, Morgan 
Stanly MS Pool, Getco 
and Knight 
Dark pool operates 
continuous, 
nondisplayed limit 
order books accepting 
market, limit, or 
“pegged orders” that 
establish prices based 
in part on observable 
market data or an 
agreed upon 
benchmark
Liquidity Cross Getco and Knight 
Dark pool operators 
generally trade on 
their own accounts as 
principles (as opposed 
to agents or 
marketplaces) to 
accept or reject 
immediately incoming 
orders
 
And ECNs are not the only players evolving intermediary platforms to 
challenge exchanges.  Broker-dealers themselves have developed back-
office platforms for “internalizing” the orders of their clients, and, just as 
important, a range of websites under the flexibility of Rule 144A and the 
JOBS Act are poised to increasingly “list” private securities in ways that 
disintermediate exchanges altogether, a topic this Article explores in more 
depth in the following section. 
2.  New Incentive Structures for Trading Venues 
With the rise in competition, exchanges consequently hunt liquidity 
much like any other market participant.  Exchanges cannot, in other words, 
assume that companies seeking to raise capital will necessarily do so on 
their exchange or via exchanges even more generally.  Moreover, secondary 
 
 272. See id. at 3. 
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trading is no longer confined to one- or two-floor exchanges, but is instead 
more widely dispersed, both geographically and from the standpoint of 
venue, than at any time in the last half century.  Specialists no longer 
monopolize the trading in any one security.  Instead, multiple market 
makers routinely offer competing offers and bids for securities.  Indeed, the 
most recent reports indicate that off-exchange venues like dark pools and 
ECNs host 40 percent of U.S. stock trading activity.273 
From this standpoint, technological innovation has addressed one of the 
core problems of exchanges from the 1930s:  the anticompetitiveness and 
rent seeking enabled by monopoly power.  With more electronic and 
computer-based competition, the NYSE and traditional exchanges are ill-
positioned to charge high commissions or trading fees for their services. 
On the other hand, the disintermediation of exchanges and exchange 
services has unleashed efforts by exchanges (and their ECN competitors) to 
attract transactions from today’s major liquidity providers, the HFTs.  
Among the most notable involve the development of different kinds of 
order types for high-frequency traders that participate and make orders on 
the exchange.  Furthermore, “maker-taker” fees—pioneered by Island in the 
late 1990s but adopted by exchanges including the NYSE—that reward 
HFTs for providing liquidity on the exchange, while charging customers 
(often mutual funds and pension funds seeking to buy blocks of stocks), 
take that liquidity.274  By offering kickbacks of this sort, maker-taker fees 
encourage trading by incentivizing firms to post orders on an exchange, 
boosting trading activity.275 
This business model, however, runs counter to the traditional “customer 
priority” design, where customer accounts are given order priority without 
having to pay exchange transaction fees.276  And they create vastly different 
incentives to trade.  Because of the rebates, brokers have been said to 
channel orders to markets that provide the best maker-taker payments, not 
the best price for customers, thereby harming investors.277  What is more, 
 
 273. See John McCrank, U.S. Securities Watchdog to Monitor Off-Exchange Stock 
Trading, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2014, 5:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/31/ 
regulations-finra-darkpools-idUSL2N0L521K20140131 (noting that 40 percent of this 
activity occurs away from the thirteen public securities exchanges, on around forty-five 
alternative trading venues) [http://perma.cc/9ABY-ZPA2]; James McAndrews & Chris 
Stefanadis, The Emergence of Electronic Communications Networks in the U.S. Equity 
Markets, 6 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. 1, 3 (2000), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/ 
current_issues/ci6-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/CY8A-PHXK]. 
 274. See PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 158–59. 
 275. Without the fees, some financial institutions have argued, fewer traders would post 
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 276. See Sherree DeCovny, Balancing the Options:  Customer Priority Versus Maker-
Taker in the U.S. Equity Options Markets, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 28–30. 
 277. See Editorial, The Hidden Costs of Trading Stocks:  “Best Execution’” and Rebates 
for Brokers, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/opinion/best-
execution-and-rebates-for-brokers.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/H5PP-UXPL]. 
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the integrity and efficiency of markets are potentially undermined.  Critics 
argue that publicly viewed bid/offer prices in the market are distorted to the 
extent to which rebates are not openly reflected in the market for 
participants, especially for retail investors, to see.278  Furthermore, the 
rebates allow HFTs to buy and sell shares at the same price and to merely 
exploit the rebates, again obscuring the “real value” or “true price” of a 
security.279  Trading, in short, is rebate generated and not necessarily driven 
by new information or economic fundamentals. 
Another significant development, again pioneered by ECNs in the 1990s 
but later adopted by exchanges, has been the development of colocation 
services for privileged (or paying) exchange customers.  For a fee, 
exchanges offer broker-dealers the opportunity “to place their trading 
computers in the same data centers that house an exchange’s computer 
servers.”280  This gives the colocated traders tremendous advantages over 
other investors.  Most traders see only the consolidated tape of prices that 
are fed through and connect exchanges in New York, Chicago, and other 
cities.  But by being placed directly next to exchange servers, colocated 
traders get information with essentially advance notice, and with 
information (often for milliseconds) that others do not have, on which they 
trade. Given the massive advantages such asymmetric informational 
superiority conveys, “trading firms, from Wall Street banks to high-
frequency hedge funds and market makers, spend millions each year” in 
order to “access prices a split second faster through direct feeds.”281 
At the extremes, exchanges have, according to recent lawsuits, taken the 
concept of speed yet a further step forward by selling private feeds of 
market data to customers before releasing the information to the public via 
the consolidated tape.282  According to plaintiffs, paying customers can 
receive the data in as little as one microsecond, whereas it takes 1500 
microseconds for the data to reach the processor (and then additional time 
for the data to be transmitted by the processor to ordinary customers).283  If 
true, the strategy would violate Regulation NMS’s dictates that exchanges 
furnish the data “as promptly as possible” and not discriminate against other 
market participants in the distribution of that information.284 
Both individually and collectively, maker-taker fees, colocation services, 
and private data feeds reflect the disintermediation of exchanges as liquidity 
 
 278. Dave Michaels, Trading Rebates Skew Markets, NYSE and Allies Tell SEC, 
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 279. See Editorial, supra note 277. 
 280. See Geoffrey Rogow, Colocation:  The Root of All High-Frequency Trading Evil?, 
WALL STREET J. BLOGS (Sep. 20, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/ 
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 281. See id. 
 282. See, e.g., Lanier v. BATS Exchange, No. 14-cv-3745, 2015 WL 191446 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 28, 2015). 
 283. See id. at 12. 
 284. Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a) (2014). 
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monopolists (or oligopolists) and, by extension, regulatory gatekeepers.  
The NYSE in particular no longer controls transactions in its shares, and 
trading is dispersed along a fragmented terrain of regional exchanges, 
ECNs, and other OTC markets.  As this development has progressed, the 
NYSE has shifted from operating as a provider of liquidity, as was in effect 
their role in the 1930s environment where large firms had limited options 
with regard to where they listed and traded securities, to a host.  As such, 
their business models have changed from warding off competition to 
engaging it head on and even mimicking many of their revenue-generating 
techniques.  In some instances, this may be a cause for celebration, such as 
the NYSE’s shift to a more automated system of transaction execution that 
has lowered commission fees for retail investors and institutions alike.  But 
it also can create incentives to behave in ways that not only stretch, but 
arguably violate, established norms for exchanges both as venues and as 
financial intermediaries for customers. 
C.  The Fall . . . and Rise of Broker-Dealers 
The disruption of exchanges had large and immediate implications for 
the broker-dealers operating on them.  Although necessary at the turn of the 
century, and in the early stages of the automatization process, human beings 
are no longer required as before to take customer orders and execute them.  
Indeed, they compare poorly to the extent to which they have shown 
themselves to be slower, and far less accurate, than their electronic 
counterparts in both front- and back-office operations.  This has led to a 
wholesale restructuring of the industry, and exchange brokers and dealers 
who survived the technological upgrades saw their profits fall as declining 
spreads and commissions cut into their pay.285 
But this is only one-half of the story.  For all of the dislocation caused by 
computerized trading, technology also created new opportunities for broker-
dealers.  After all, at the heart of a broker-dealer’s work is “matching” 
investments to investors, albeit by commission, and/or making smart 
investments on its own account.  Electronic trading presented new 
opportunities to do so on a scale not contemplated by earlier generations. 
So not surprisingly, brokers used technology to create new kinds of 
matching services.  On traditional exchanges, specialists abandoned their 
traditional informational advantages and assumed new nominations as 
“designated market makers” (DMMs).  As DMMs, they could no longer 
receive an advance look at incoming orders, and instead provided liquidity 
according to preestablished protocols that catered to electronic orders.  
Meanwhile, other broker-dealers operating outside of the formal exchange 
system began to assume exchange-like functions insofar as they themselves 
began to host and became venues for securities trading.  Importantly, these 
venues were not necessarily monopolized by one market maker.  Instead, 
 
 285. See generally McAndrews & Stefanadis, supra note 273 (discussing the effects from 
the proliferation of ECNs). 
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they were built out in ways that allowed other broker-dealers (as well as 
funds, investment managers, and institutional investors) to aggregate—and 
that platform itself could be connected to others. 
By making these changes in the face of changing technological 
developments, many broker-dealers have survived and thrived, and a new 
generation of financial services intermediaries has come of age.  With the 
help of ever more powerful technological tools, broker-dealers can funnel 
trading into networks that bypass traditional exchange infrastructure.  At the 
same time, many have not only become agents of liquidity, but are also 
dominant sources of liquidity via their HFT arms and algorithmic trading 
outfits.  The sheer volume of orders made possible by instantaneous trades 
and millisecond-based execution has by extension transformed the very 
nature of liquidity on exchange markets.  Liquidity is no longer a simple 
function of supply and demand dynamics, but is instead often driven by the 
arbitrage opportunities enabled by speed and superior data management. 
Broker-dealers have likewise capitalized on the internet in particular to 
change their business model from the ground up.  In all but name, broker-
dealers can increasingly “list” securities on their own for investment.  
Crowdfunding websites allow financial services intermediaries to match 
investors with investment opportunities, one of the core functions of 
brokers, but on a scale far greater than before and in ways that can 
aggregate investors collectively.  Likewise, and as mentioned above, the 
operators of 144A crowdfunding platforms are increasingly poised to 
provide a means for investing in private companies and other entities in the 
comfort of a controlled professional space, accredited investors’ homes. 
There are, of course, plenty of mainline broker-dealers who continue to 
offer and provide marketing functions for offerings.286  That said, none of 
the most consequential changes in trading infrastructure or operations map 
onto the 1930s regulatory framework, which envisioned a far different 
market ecosystem than is the case today.  The framers of the 1930s 
legislation envisioned exchanges as the dominant meeting place for 
securities trading and, thus, the broker-dealers operating on them as agents 
(albeit oligopolistic ones) of market integrity.  These regulatory gatekeepers 
thus became subject to federal securities legislation and obligations of 
maintaining orderly markets. 
But freed from exchange infrastructure, and the regulatory requirements 
associated with it, broker-dealers operating ECNs have, for the most part, 
been under no obligation to satisfy traditional market-making 
responsibilities.287  Instead, best execution obligations to connect limit 
 
 286. Though even here, technology has greatly impacted their operations. See Coffee, 
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 287. Indeed, according to some commentators, “[u]nlike the traditional market-maker and 
specialist systems, [the new intermediaries] have no obligation to provide liquidity, just the 
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orders to venues that meet Regulation NMS dictates are the mechanism 
through which the maintenance of orderly markets rely.288  In practice, this 
means that broker-dealers are obligated to swap downside market-making 
obligations normally associated with traditional exchanges for upside best 
execution restraints in today’s markets.  The two are, by their nature, in no 
way overlapping; the net result is risk siphoned off from market makers in 
turbulent market environments.  Algorithmically generated limit orders 
from HFTs can, in short, disappear in milliseconds—as quickly as they 
appear—for no reason other than downward market momentum.  This, in 
turn, can enable “flash crashes,” like that of May 6, 2010, which can 
undermine the stability of technically interconnected capital markets.289  
Plus, rogue or unexpected algorithm activity or faulty hardware or software 
can cause systems to short-circuit or freeze, creating new operational 
risks.290 
More fundamentally, broker-dealer regulation is itself facing potential 
changes as the internet and technology dramatically transform the very 
business models of financial services firms and broker-dealers in particular.  
With new technologies available to broker-dealers to aggregate liquidity, 
the need to charge transaction-based commissions tied to marketing efforts 
has diminished.  Instead, financial intermediaries can generate alternative 
sources of revenue, like trading fees or other proprietary or bespoke 
services, for participants on the platform. 
The most significant example of such innovation arose in venture capital 
services, which have sought to leverage web-based social media and crowd 
investing.  In 2013, FundersClub, a private placement platform, initiated a 
new business model whereby it would avoid broker-dealer requirements by 
in part mimicking the matching qualities seen on electronic trading 
platforms.291  In short, FundersClub created a website that offered 
opportunities to invest in specifically identified private companies listed on 
the site.  Members of the FundersClub platform then can invest, but only 
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after first certifying themselves as accredited investors and waiting thirty 
days.292  FundersClub then aggregates members into a venture capital fund 
that makes an investment, which is then managed by FundersClub on a 
post-investment basis.293  It was compensated, notably, for its efforts via a 
carried interest in the fund.294  Months later, a similar approach was 
adopted by AngelList, with the additional innovation of leveraging the 
insights, experience, and efforts of third-party “Lead Angels,” whereby a 
fund organized by AngelList would invest only alongside a recognized 
investor who may or may not also receive a portion of the carried 
interest.295 
In some ways, the deal dynamics were merely web-based venture capital.  
But at the same time, they created novel challenges of interpretation.  
Though clearly the venture capital fund would have to comply with rules 
relating to investment advisors, would the platforms themselves (and their 
operators) require broker-dealer regulation?  After all, the matching services 
performed, in some ways, the same services as twentieth-century broker-
dealers by connecting investment dollars to investments with the help of a 
middleman.  The difference here, however, is how a broker-dealer’s 
earnings are derived.  Instead of a commission, which itself incentivized at 
times unscrupulous salesmanship, here the middleman would earn by 
participating in the investment’s carried interest.  It is also, notably, a 
venture among accredited investors who can presumably “fend for 
themselves.”296  With this in mind, the SEC, in a no-action letter, ultimately 
declined to enforce against the operators of the FundersClub and AngelList 
websites for failing to register as a broker-dealer under the Exchange 
Act.297 
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Notably, the JOBS Act has cleared a path for a similar bypassing of 
broker-dealer rules for financial services firms connecting early-stage 
investment opportunities to non-accredited investors, assuming certain 
conditions are filled.  In the legislation, crowdfunding portals—the websites 
displaying ventures in need of funding—are recognized as a new kind of 
financial intermediary legally distinct from broker-dealers and are not 
required to undergo the same registration requirements.  Although the 
portals will be subject to supervision by FINRA, the self-regulatory agency 
that (not coincidentally) oversees broker-dealers, there are no “know the 
customer obligations,” as would be expected by typical broker-dealers.  
Instead, investments are merely posted on the website, according to some 
business prerogative or objective or after inspection by the portal manager, 
and the onus of “knowing” the customer resides in ensuring that certain 
prudential requirements (e.g., the investment caps) are properly 
administered. 
IV.  RETHINKING TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY REGULATORY RESPONSES 
At this point, it is helpful to reiterate that not all of the disruption outlined 
above is necessarily bad.  With markets meeting the web, investors are in 
many ways better armed and better equipped to access information relevant 
to their decisions than ever before.  That said, the accelerating 
disintermediation of New Deal gatekeepers places unprecedented stress on 
traditional regulatory approaches and forms of market supervision.  
Outdated regulatory approaches have, for their part, the potential of stifling 
even useful forms of innovation.  And in those areas where disruption 
complicates or undermines investor protection or market integrity, one-shot 
substantive reforms of existing regulatory approaches are highly unlikely to 
be durable.  As this part shows, not only are foundational categories and 
focal points of 1930s regulatory oversight increasingly out of kilter with the 
new market ecosystem, but multiplying policy objectives and increased 
uncertainty as to the market impact of reforms also hamper the rulemaking 
process.  Indeed, even where agencies unveil smart new approaches, the 
specter of technological innovation can render even upgraded regulatory 
approaches outdated in a matter of milliseconds. 
As a result, the challenge of disruptive technology and securities 
regulation requires not only rethinking the substance of regulation but also 
rethinking the process by which administration is administered.  This part 
provides both the rationale and basic typology for a move from reactive, 
prescriptive regulation—also a relic of New Deal reforms in the wake of the 
Great Depression—to more responsive, adaptive forms of supervisory 
oversight. 
A.  The Challenge of Expanding the Regulatory Perimeter 
As seen in Part I, securities regulation has long enjoyed, as a key 
component of its operative strategy, the dragooning of several key 
intermediaries into the service of national policy objectives.  By 
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(mandatorily) registering and supervising central nodes of the financial 
services industry and the originators and facilitators of securities issuances, 
regulators could cast a wide net with which to promote investor protection 
and market integrity.  Thus, not surprisingly, as the market ecosystem has 
changed, interest in expanding the regulatory perimeter has blossomed—
either by imposing more duties on existing actors or extending new 
regulations to emerging players in the ecosystem.  Such approaches, 
however, have proven difficult to execute due to several practical and 
administrative challenges. 
1.  Old Categories Do Not (Always) Fit 
the New Market Ecosystem 
Rapid technological change makes expanding the regulatory perimeter 
more difficult, at least insofar as it has been accomplished in the past.  At a 
basic level, technological and deal-driven innovation has progressed to such 
a point that intermediaries no longer fit neatly into twentieth-century molds 
of exchanges, specialists, floor brokers, and even broker-dealers.  Statutory 
definitions are out of date, and broker-dealers, exchanges, and investment 
advisers provide overlapping, and in some instances economically, identical 
services.  Regulatory action, as a result, has become more difficult “as 
markets provide ever more viable [or attractive] choices” for firms and 
individuals seeking to raise capital or trade securities.298 
Plus, there is not only a multiplicity of regulators, but also a myriad of 
outdated conceptual and jurisdictional tools relied on by them.  For 
example, efforts by FINRA, the SEC, and state regulators to target firms 
based on presumptions of commission-driven jurisdictional hooks for 
broker-dealers will be less relevant in a world where the revenues generated 
by intermediaries and infrastructure operators are derived from listing and 
trading fees or from providing venture capital advice and consulting 
services.  Similarly, efforts to define or capture new intermediaries can be 
difficult.299  Take the simple exercise of defining (and regulating) 
“exchanges”:  defining exchanges as venues that provide formal listing 
services, or even trading environments for major companies, is increasingly 
under strain where secondary trading is hosted by ECNs and where listing 
(especially in private placements) is increasingly becoming a less formal 
means of advertising an investment opportunity.  Even basic concepts of 
“private” and “public” offerings become more difficult to disentangle to the 
extent to which more money is raised in private offerings than in traditional 
IPOs. 
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2.  Regulatory Objectives Have Multiplied 
in the Post-Crisis (and Post-Recession) Era 
Moving further afield, even where targeting specific financial 
intermediaries is, from a conceptual standpoint, relatively straightforward, 
just how to do so may not be.  This is in part because deeper or broader 
regulation could conflict with other important policy priorities.  As we saw 
above, the regulation of exchanges has consistently been mired in questions 
of the primacy of liquidity or competitiveness.  And even more 
fundamentally, U.S. securities laws, like the SEC that enforces them, are 
imbued with varying policy goals, from investor protection to market 
integrity, with both occasionally conflicting with one another.300 
That said, the potential for regulatory dissonance is higher now than in 
the past.  And it is not just because financial innovation has restructured 
markets and the optics through which we view gatekeepers.  It also is 
because recent post-crisis legislation has emphasized, albeit in varying 
sections of the regulation, both more regulation in light of financial 
innovation and fewer regulatory costs for raising capital, especially for 
small and medium-sized businesses seeking capital in a world of reduced 
bank lending.  Superimposing both objectives and their own statutory 
ecosystems onto the New Deal framework creates a number of challenging 
trade-offs where ambitious expansions of regulatory remit are taken. 
The JOBS Act provides a simple, straightforward example.  By design, 
the JOBS Act was devised in order to reduce the regulatory burdens 
associated with making public offerings, especially for early-stage 
companies looking to access cash for ventures.  But by doing so, it 
dislocates and sidelines other players:  investment bankers are no longer 
working to underwrite the transactions; no listing is made on a fully 
regulated exchange; and the disclosures of a traditional public offering are 
greatly reduced.  This then raises questions of investor protection, and with 
other gatekeepers out of the picture, the most logical place of regulatory 
pressure is the portal listing the securities.  However, by doing so, costs that 
are placed on portals are driven up and offerings are potentially forced to 
register, which reduces their ability to earn revenues and ultimately forces 
them into the more rarified space of private placements.  As a result, the 
idea of providing retail investors with modest opportunities to participate in 
early-stage ventures (and the ability of early-stage companies to access their 
capital) is largely frustrated. 
The balance becomes all the more complicated with other (laudatory) 
goals like financial stability, which take center stage in rulemaking and 
supervision.  In a post-Lehman Brothers world, the SEC has been tasked 
alongside other agencies with new responsibilities to ensure sound and 
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stable markets—which increasingly involve issues of market design and 
electronic operations.  Meeting the challenge will not be easy.  As in the 
1960s back-office crisis, today’s technology can lead to more efficient 
services, but if poorly implemented, it also can replicate and generate new 
problems that are as damaging to investor confidence as human error and 
sluggishness.  Moreover, in a world of computer-driven trading, where the 
frequency of transactions is driving transaction volumes to ever-dizzying 
heights, glitches in technology, as well as faulty programming, have outsize 
effects on financial markets.  The introduction of technology can thus help 
crack oligopolies and discipline old-line market actors, yet at the same time 
generate new sources of systemic risk.  Consequently, any regulatory 
response can at least potentially have a range of trade-offs with regard to 
other policy goals, including capital formation and market liquidity. 
3.  Extreme Policy Uncertainty Is Ill-Suited 
to Longstanding Administrative Processes 
How to regulate may also be difficult, even where policy goals are clear, 
because of the novelty that many regulatory issues present.  Technology is 
not only accelerating trends that have been in motion for a half-century, like 
the speed of making or executing market transactions, it is also reshaping 
how market actors respond by disintermediating gatekeepers and even 
supplanting human judgment with computer programming.301 
The novelty of such changes places enormous strain on governmental 
response mechanisms.  The consequences of microstructural change of this 
order, especially given its constant flux, is difficult, and in many instances 
impossible, to predict—as are the repercussions of any particular portfolio 
of regulatory reform.  As scholars have noted in similar contexts, law is 
both an endogenous and exogenous force in shaping market ecosystems.302  
Regulations inform the commitments and relationships created by market 
participants, undergird the certainty behind financial transactions, and can 
serve as the focal point for technological innovation.  Law can thus alter the 
competitive and cooperative relationships and interactions among market 
participants and infrastructure providers in ways that in turn give rules 
unexpected consequences. 
Again, Regulation NMS serves as a useful example.  As seen above, the 
best price mandates embraced in the reforms not only imposed higher 
regulatory burdens, but also ignited the ECN industry and even algorithmic 
trading.  Once the reforms were promulgated, AI was not only 
commercially practical, but a practical necessity.  Now, all trading venues 
have to constantly monitor the price of the stock on every trading venue, all 
the time, a feat that requires industrial-strength computer power.  Though 
 
 301. See Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257, 279–80 (2010). 
 302. See, e.g., D. Sornette, Endogenous Versus Exogenous Origins of Crises, ETH 
ZURICH, http://www.er.ethz.ch/media/essays/origins.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/CNS3-NJQD]. 
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the SEC was aware of the potential that such reforms would require using 
technology to upgrade existing systems for compliance purposes, few 
imagined a world where such operating systems would displace auction 
systems and the traditional trading floors altogether—and in the process 
potentially fragment the market’s price discovery processes.303 
Policy uncertainty of this sort presents problems for today’s regulatory 
system.  U.S. agencies act via processes that are themselves mediated 
through comprehensive planning and prescriptive regulation.  For the SEC 
to promulgate rules, proposals must usually be shared with the public 
through notice-and-comment processes and run through varying levels of 
internal evaluation and, not infrequently, government-wide coordination.304  
Furthermore, judicial dictates require “hyper detailed predecisional impact 
assessments” in order to establish a robust capacity to predict and assess the 
market and nonmarket impacts of any proposed action.305 
Reacting at the administrative level to the responses of regulated entities 
to regulatory reforms can in turn become difficult, especially when first-
order rules require either legislative compromise or significant 
administrative resources.  Policymakers are incentivized to cram “all that 
c[an] possibly be thought or dreamed about actions they carry out, fund, or 
authorize into single-shot, all-encompassing decision extravaganzas.”306  
Once made, decisions take their course, in ways expected and otherwise, 
and authorities (and market participants and the public at large) live with 
the consequences until a future crisis arises or economic or political cycles 
change.  Regulatory action, as a result, can often become ossified as new 
priorities crowd an administrative or rulemaking agenda.  Little effort is 
made to refine or modify decisions made, making first-order regulatory 
decisions all the more weighty—and often slow to be made.  Law thus 
tends to be more static, and outdated, than would be warranted in any 
context of dynamic change. 
B.  The Attractiveness (and Limitations) 
of Objectives-Based Regulation 
One potentially attractive answer to such challenges has been the 
implementation of more targeted “objectives-based” regulation.307  
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[http://perma.cc/9A5Y-TZ4J]. 
 304. See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014). 
 305. Id. 
 306. See id. at 5; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and 
Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 167 (2014) (describing the view among new 
experimentalists who decry the pluralist interest group model as broken, captured by the 
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Although the precise contours of the term are occasionally subject to some 
debate, ultimately the idea turns on evaluating compliance with agency 
rules in terms of the degree to which a regulator’s objectives and policy 
preferences are met.  Objectives-based regulation is often associated with 
“principles-based regulation.”308  This need not, however, be the case.  In 
contrast to principles based regulation, objectives-based regulation not only 
queries whether participants are acting within the spirit of underlying rules, 
but also whether conduct achieves a specific objective. 
At the same time, objectives-based regulation acknowledges that there 
may be more than one way to achieve a specific regulatory objective.  And 
thus, some forms of compliance may be more efficient or effective for some 
market participants than others.  Because of this flexibility, some 
commentators associate it with “minimalist” liberal theories of governance 
that give license to market-based decision making.309  For regulators, 
however, the appeal of objectives-based regulation is that the specifics of 
hard-to-operationalize mandates can be informed “more dynamically and 
insightfully by those with the greatest understanding of the relevant 
situations.”310 
In short, regulatory rules are not so much supposed to be “vague” as 
much as relevant—and rather than ossifying, compliance practices are 
expected to evolve as older formulations are updated with new 
technologies, market practices, and risks (and opportunities) for the 
investing public.  For this reason, for example, many regulators laud 
approaches like FINRA’s “know your customer” and “suitability” rules that 
give supervisors broad powers when applying standards of fairness, 
appropriate disclosure, and fiduciary duty obligations where broker-dealers 
interact with the public.  With rapidly changing intermediaries and firms 
processing investments, a flexible, though potentially upward-ratcheting, 
system of engagement helped authorities respond to markets in ways that 
helped cabin opportunities to exploit gaps in an increasingly outmoded, 
eighty-year-old system of rule-based prescriptions.  Similarly, the SEC’s 
new Regulation SCI requires entities like exchanges and other infrastructure 
providers to “design[], develop[], test[], maintain[], operate[], and surveil[] 
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systems” that are integral to their operations and requires that their 
technology meets prescribed operational standards.311 
The ability to institutionalize objectives-based regulation will 
nevertheless depend on the circumstances.  First, some objectives clearly 
will be more important than others, or have priority whereas others will not.  
Where objectives have a clear hierarchy, creating a system that reflects 
primary policy concerns is rather straightforward; where on the other hand 
objectives occupy the same levels of importance, the trade-offs inherent to 
pursuing any one compliance approach can produce uncertainty by 
regulated entities as to optimal compliance strategies. 
Furthermore, the ability to graft objectives to the changing market 
ecosystem will vary.  For example, the violation of antifraud rules can be 
relatively easy to spot even in today’s quickly evolving marketplace.312  
Making omissions or misstatements tied to the sale of securities is 
identifiable whether they are conducted online or in person.  Similarly, even 
if venues change, false or deceptive statements about who is operating the 
system or performing the trades are easily cognizable as fraudulent, and 
even traditional antifraud concepts and remedies are sufficient to address 
old problems in new contexts. 
Enforcement becomes harder when old concepts themselves go under 
partial revision due to changes in market infrastructure.  Take the issue of 
front running, for example.  As we saw above, in the 1930s, there was a 
concern related to the ability of specialists to extract rents (through higher 
bid-ask spreads) given their ability to see orders coming down the pike.313  
Today, it is commonly associated with high-speed market makers, who 
weave in between markets.  But are the two the same?  In OTC markets, 
HFT traders may or may not be market makers and, in any case, do not 
have access to a formal limit book like specialists a half-century ago.  
Instead, the market ecosystem has changed.  They may pay for direct feeds 
from exchanges or other venues, which give them time advantages.  But 
advantages in time, in and of themselves, could also be analogous to floor 
traders and brokers who first had access to the telegraph in the 1800s, 
phone banks in the mid-twentieth century, and later the fax machine.  With 
faster communications, brokers and dealers with access to technology could 
leverage their information before others—and securities regulations did not 
necessarily prohibit traders from trading on their informational advantages. 
The NMS “best execution” rules, themselves in many ways a kind of 
objectives-based regulatory mandate, offer another example.  When first 
 
 311. See Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act Release No. 
73,639 (Nov. 19, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249); SEC, STAFF 
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT SCI INDUSTRY STANDARDS (2014), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 
2014/staff-guidance-current-sci-industry-standards.pdf [http://perma.cc/3TK6-TQG6]. 
 312. Cf. Deanna Whitestone, The Response to Enron in the United States and Canada:  
Are Principles-Based Accounting Standards More Effective at Preventing Financial Fraud?, 
11 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 381 (2005) (comparing the effectiveness of a rules-based standard 
to a principles-based approach in preventing corporate fraud). 
 313. See supra p. 995. 
1042 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
pronounced, they required brokers to provide the most advantageous order 
execution for their customers, which was at least assumed to be based on 
price.  But how specifically they were to be implemented was largely left to 
market participants.  Technology developed, however, in ways to 
differentiate the market and customer demands that justified several 
interpretations of the rule.  Specifically, broker-dealers realized that their 
customers, especially large investment funds seeking to quickly deleverage, 
occasionally valued speed and certainty of execution over price.  So with 
little explicit guidance, broker-dealers interpreted the parameters in ways 
that allowed them to charge premiums (higher than other brokers) where 
they offered other services promising superior execution.  The upshot has 
been arguably more competition in the provision of trading services.  But 
one consequence has been a gradual decline of the rule into irrelevance in 
the absence of supplemental rulemaking and guidance—and increasing 
opportunities to skim profits from customers. 
As a result, objectives-based regulation can have highly unexpected 
consequences, even more than prescriptive regulatory approaches.  
Regulatory authorities would have to have both the ability and discretion to 
issue emergency orders and take immediate administrative remedial action 
where necessary in order to mitigate overly flexible policy interpretations 
by market participants.  Closely related, in order to be most effective, 
objectives-based regulation requires considerable agency resources to 
operationalize.  As discussed above, under the current regulatory 
dispensation, resources are devoted toward drafting specific rules, 
collecting feedback from stakeholders, and crafting proposals in ways to 
achieve policy priorities while accommodating diverse interests.314  In a 
world of objectives-based processes, by contrast, resources are needed for a 
sustained investment in the infrastructure to support additional supervisory 
and relationship management personnel with firms, surveillance of market 
participants, and ongoing education programs to build more dialogic 
relationships with regulated actors.315  As a result, objectives-based 
processes generally impose a higher and more permanent cost structure as 
compared to the rules-based approach that has characterized securities 
regulation since the New Deal. 
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C.  Two Models of Adaptive Financial Regulation 
The appeal of objectives-based regulation is that it allows the market to 
find the most efficient means of meeting given regulatory objectives.  But 
regulators need not always rely on the private sector for de facto rulemaking 
or compliance.  Market actors are focused on maximizing profits and act 
with limited knowledge beyond their own individual circumstances.  
Furthermore, they may not have system-wide information relating to the 
practices of competitors and may fail to take into consideration (and simply 
disregard) the implications of their conduct for the health of the financial 
markets.  Compliance techniques and market practices may, as a result, 
prove suboptimal. 
Because of the inherent limitations of self-regulation, regulatory 
authorities, too, can innovate, not only with regard to the substance of 
market rules but also in terms of their tactics.  Specifically, the SEC has at 
its disposal tools to adjust its rulemaking in ways that enable more 
knowledgeable, speedy, but incremental rulemaking that is often well-
suited to a world of constant microstructural change.  When utilized, this 
approach fosters experimentation to create more effective bespoke 
responses to new regulatory challenges. 
The intellectual, if not practical, heritage of adaptive regulation at large is 
considerable, and its theoretical lineage reaches back to the original legal 
realists.316  The objective is “not to carve away agency discretion, as 
market-based regulation does, but to add to it, albeit in a vastly different 
form compared to the front-end model.”317  Under this model, agencies 
would not be removed from the decision-making process or 
disintermediated by the market as sources of regulatory authority.  Instead, 
the decisions are made over a broader time horizon that makes the “front 
end” and the “back end” of decision making much less relevant.318  As 
opposed to crafting one omnibus package of reforms, 
agencies employing adaptive management engage in a program of 
iterative decisionmaking following a structured, multistep protocol:  (1) 
definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for 
management, (3) determination of the baseline, (4) development of 
conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, (6) implementation and 
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management actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step 
(1).319 
1.  Pilot Programs 
In practice, the stage for regulatory experimentalism could play out in 
various ways.  One approach would be to selectively adopt trial periods for 
new regulatory approaches where prospective rules and reforms could be 
tested and explored.  So for example, the ban on general solicitation could 
be lifted for five years, with a sunset provision triggered absent some 
additional regulatory blessing.  Or more onerous investigatory requirements 
on portals could be lifted where other (statistical or algorithmic) 
technologies are used to test or limit exposures of retail investors in 
crowdfunded securities, but likewise set to expire absent some regulatory 
finding that they insufficiently track or identify breaches in prudential 
requirements for investors. 
To provide a sense of what an experiment could look like, consider the 
example of crowdfunding portals and the question of whether they should 
be able to provide information to potential investors about the quality of 
securities (either credit- or investment-wise) for prospective investors.  
From a regulatory standpoint, the fear is that insofar as portals begin to start 
differentiating investors, they take on aspects of giving investment advice.  
Enabling them to differentiate would thus provide a path around the 
Investment Advisers Act and its protections for investors.  Portals would 
not be subject to the Investment Advisers Act’s important prohibitions 
against conflicts of interest and disclosures to investors about the persons 
who are paid for advice concerning the desirability of investing in 
securities.  On the other hand, providing basic kinds of information, like the 
credit rating of sponsoring entrepreneurs and education data of the 
entrepreneur, could well help investors make wiser decisions. 
The question thus arises whether a more permissive regulatory scheme 
for portals would end up undermining or bolstering protections for 
investors.  In many ways, this is a conceptual question and can be addressed 
by comparing the nature of the information provided by portals and the 
risks such tools would generate for investors.  But empirical data could 
provide even more concrete information. 
Here is how an easy experiment could be conducted:  a study could be 
announced allowing some portals, upon randomized selection, to provide 
deeper levels of disclosure to investors.  The first test group would be 
permitted to evaluate the company and provide information to the public 
relating to easily understandable metrics.  These metrics could include 
FICO or credit scores (where the entrepreneur agrees) or the answers to 
simple queries—such as whether the entrepreneur has taken or passed a 
financial statement analysis course or other business course or whether the 
entrepreneur has enrolled in a prep course for emerging managers 
 
 319. See id. at 7. 
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established by the portal.  A second test group would meanwhile be 
permitted to employ all of the above, as well as screen issuances placed on 
its platform, and advertise the screening.  Finally, a control group would 
consist of portals under the current regulatory regime, subject to deep 
restrictions regarding the degree to which issuer information can be 
provided to the public. 
Throughout the pilot period, participating portals would be required to 
collect and report the following data to the SEC: 
 
1) The number of campaigns successfully completed; 
2) The speed at which campaigns are successfully completed 
(capital accumulation); 
3) Investor complaints lodged against the portal investments; and 
4) The number of failed ventures (in all cases, entrepreneurs whose 
ventures failed would be required to report to the portals, within 
five days, the liquidation of their business). 
 
An initial assessment could then be conducted one year after the 
commencement of the pilot.  The assessment could include: 
 
1) Assessments of the statistical impact of providing information on 
the quality of investment decisions by investors; 
2) Assessments of the economic impact of providing information on 
the speed of capital accumulation; and 
3) Assessments of the economic impact of providing information on 
the profits of the portal. 
 
Thereafter, a rule could be drafted, or a subsequent extension of the 
experiment (or a different experiment under other parameters) could be 
conducted, depending on the results of the experiment and conclusiveness 
of the data received. 
The idea of such an approach would, in short, be to create data for 
making regulatory decisions, much as the Food and Drug Administration 
does for experimental drugs.  Along these lines, regulatory experimentation 
would allow a peek into the likely consequences of any particular policy 
action.  Regulators could ask some of the questions central to policymaking 
in today’s rapidly changing market infrastructure in advance:  What should 
be the parameters for solicitation online and in an internet economy?  What 
reasonable verification steps should be used for investor accreditation or 
wealth thresholds for crowdfunding?  What kinds of potential innovations 
can and should be deployed to police the speed of financial transactions and 
the comparative advantages (and market risks) that such speed generates? 
The deployment of such strategies would represent a considerable change 
in regulatory tactics for today’s regulators.  As mentioned above, the SEC 
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often relies on no-action letters to test varying approaches.320  And it can 
even promote, as seen in the case of FundersClub, a channel of further 
market disintermediation by allowing new business models to adapt to the 
platform and structure of the internet.  That said, no-action letters are not 
controlled experiments.  They do not require data collection and reporting 
or, for that matter, any iterative contact or information sharing with 
regulators during the course of the relevant conduct.  As a result, they 
provide only a limited channel for bolstering regulatory expertise.  
Meanwhile, from the standpoint of market participants, no-action letters 
offer relief only to the firm making a request and, even then, only indicate 
that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Commission take 
enforcement action against the requester based on the facts and 
representations described in the individual’s or entity’s request.  No 
guarantees are made. 
Experimentalism, however, is not in itself new to securities regulation.  
The SEC has conducted more formal experiments and does so even today.  
The order handling rules, discussed above,321 were phased in on a pilot 
basis, just as rules relating to short sales.  And the national market system, 
in particular, has used the strategy.  In 2011, the NYSE and other exchanges 
pushed for pilot circuit-breaker programs to help mitigate the impact of 
flash crashes.322  And more recently, in 2014, the SEC announced a one-
year pilot program to widen minimum quoting and trading increments (or 
“tick sizes”) for small-cap stocks.323  Instead of regulating the field in its 
entirety, the program instructed FINRA and national securities exchanges to 
divide stocks of firms with market capitalizations of $5 billion or less into 
three test groups of four hundred stocks and a control group.324  The control 
group will use the current tick size of one cent per share, while the test 
groups will all quote small-cap shares at five-cent minimum increments, 
according to a news release from the SEC.325 
The idea behind the program is to test whether wider tick sizes increase 
the liquidity for smaller stocks.  Theoretically, a wider spread between bid 
and offer prices would mean more profits for dealers and market makers, 
though it also could mean higher commissions and charges for individuals 
when they trade.  The policy question is whether these hidden charges 
would be worthwhile to the extent they generated greater interest by traders 
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and thus increase demand for stock issuances by the small-cap firms.  After 
reviewing the data, agency officials would examine what impact the 
reforms would have on the quality of the issuances and whether the 
program should be extended. 
Notice that this kind of approach allows for multitiered rulemaking.  
Proposals are not one-shot exercises memorialized into law.  And the data 
itself can help to inform regulatory decisions as well as (if necessary) 
further stakeholder comments.  It generates, in short, the opportunity for a 
positive informational feedback loop and, by extension, better grounded 
decision making. 
That said, experimentation of this sort is far from celebrated.  The SEC 
has no webpage or official policy toward pilot programs.  Neither are there 
formal protocols about when and under what circumstances they are used.  
As a result, without strict guidance, the reliance on data-driven exercises is 
driven by regulatory agendas and politics, as opposed to strict policy 
mandates. 
2.  Innovation Hubs 
Another more ambitious approach involves shifting from micro-level 
experimentation to system-wide enterprise zones for financial market 
compliance and regulatory adaptation.  Compliance costs, for example, 
could be offset or subsidized by other forms of regulatory assistance or 
other relief where they meet or surpass basic minimum standards.  So, for 
example, avenues of special information sharing and expedited assistance 
could be opened with targeted industry members for the fulfillment of 
desired regulatory objectives.  Or investment tax credits could be provided 
for market participants that undertake strategies to bolster investor 
protection or market stability.326 
Along these lines, incentives could be provided to develop new 
techniques or data analysis infrastructures for portals to help ensure that 
investors have not breached personal investment limits promulgated under 
the JOBS Act.  Or regulators could work alongside 144A websites to 
deliver and bless new data analytics that help ensure that ultimate 
purchasers of securities are accredited investors.  Or market-making 
obligations could be eased where market infrastructures adopted speed 
bumps for trading or “off switches” to shut down trading where volatility is 
poised to generate a flash crash.  In any event, technology could be 
leveraged in ways that not only change the cost structure and competition 
within markets—and even obscure the operations of markets and price 
discovery—but that also enhance prudential safeguards for investors. 
This, too, is not an entirely novel proposal.  In 2014, for example, the 
U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) launched an “innovation hub” 
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aimed at helping to support and more effectively oversee a team of experts 
to in turn support financial technology startups that demonstrate that their 
innovations can help support consumers, whether individuals or 
businesses.327  Additionally, the hub will have a designated function of 
exploring how regulation can be adapted not only to contain growth, but 
also to foster it alongside investor protection.  To do the job, the FCA will 
reportedly help steer young companies, or established companies with new 
models or financial products, through the regulatory process—and likewise 
learn new ways to administer more effective rules adapted to evolving 
technological developments.328 
It also is designed to help regulators familiarize themselves with new 
technology.  This in and of itself will require considerable face-to-face 
engagement for formal applications submitted by technology companies, as 
well as reiterated contact between regulators and regulated entities prior to 
the promulgation of rules.329  Thus, the innovation hub will provide 
qualifying businesses with a dedicated contact for innovation-related 
queries, including individual guidance and continued additional support for 
up to a year after authorization in order to help developers understand the 
regulatory framework and how it applies to them.330  In this way, areas of 
likely complexity can be identified early on, to help both focus regulators 
on potential challenges and ensure that potential applications are processed 
as quickly as possible. 
And the United Kingdom is not alone.  For the last two decades, 
countries have developed a variety of mechanisms to help spur not only 
market but also regulatory innovation and adaptability.  China, for one, has 
established a “Shanghai Free Trade Zone” designed to facilitate capital 
account liberalization.331  As part of this process, the government has 
designated Shanghai as the primary locus for the experimentation and 
launching of market reforms.332  Keys to this have included an array of 
regulatory measures (1) connecting mainland stock exchanges to Hong 
Kong, (2) allowing more cross-border investment, and (3) enabling foreign 
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direct investment into the country.333  Market reforms have additionally 
embraced a number of regulatory enhancements.  For each program, new 
rules have been unveiled, usually on a “pilot” basis, ranging from issues as 
diverse as quotas permitted to foreign funds and investors putting their 
capital to work onshore to changes in derivatives contracts to allow better 
netting of exposures in case of a counterparty default.  The key to the 
process has, above all, been the cautious opening of the market, while also 
instituting new rules to support the process.  Incremental and targeted, the 
process relies on experiments that are under the auspices of authorities 
within the zone and, if successful, are then “exported” to the rest of the 
country, or as seen in the case of the recent slowdown of China’s economy, 
slowed precipitously. 
That said, securing an “innovation dividend” flowing from adaptive 
compliance systems requires deep procedural reforms in the United States.  
Arguably the same kinds of administrative hurdles and procedures like 
notice and comment would be required on the back end (post-
experimentation) as on the front end.334  Furthermore, the promulgation of 
rules generally requires a range of internal clearing processes, dictated by 
courts and executive orders, and internal policymaking traditions.  Some of 
these clearance processes, like cost-benefit analyses, could be streamlined, 
or even shortened in light of the new information generated by controlled 
regulatory experiments.  Divvying rulemaking into two stages could, 
however, effectively double the procedural load required to pass rules as a 
range of constituencies (from chief counsel offices of divisions to general 
counsel to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—the 
executive office in charge of ironically streamlining regulatory costs) would 
need consulting at varying stages of the policymaking process.  As a result, 
a twenty-first-century securities framework would ideally create a set of 
standards enabling experimentation, either through an objectives-based 
regime or via ex ante rules, which would provide a means to leverage 
technology for both efficiency and investor protection. 
Incentive programs, too, would run across a range of regulatory 
limitations, both procedural and substantive.  Not only would legislation 
have to be amended in order to provide the basis for offering explicit 
incentives in other regulatory sectors (like tax), but prudential rules also 
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could require amending in nontraditional ways.  For example, if a 
crowdfunding site wanted to rate borrowers in order to help investors, say 
by posting scores for companies that indicate the degree to which they have 
gone beyond minimum disclosures of the JOBS Act, it would be viewed as 
effectively “advising” them and would thereby become a broker-dealer in 
the eyes of securities regulators.335  Thus, in order to assist firms in the 
provision of new investor protections, substantive regulatory requirements 
in the Exchange Act and Investment Advisor Act would require amending 
or, at a minimum, special exemptions. 
Moreover, innovation zones, trial periods, and experimentation, like 
objectives-based regulation, could increase considerably the costs of 
regulation, at least as compared to traditional administrative processes.  As 
indicated above, resources must be expended not only to propose legislation 
and review comments, but also to create the parameters for 
experimentation, develop proper safeguards, and examine the results for 
developing and refining initial policy hunches.  Furthermore, even after 
developing thoughtful policy approaches, it will likely be necessary to 
periodically update and refine policies in ways to speak to changes in 
market practices or infrastructures.  Thus, more resources would likely be 
necessary than those utilized in prescriptive, rules-based models of 
oversight that have dominated regulation since the 1930s. 
With this in mind, the smartest policy approaches will have to leverage 
regulatory tools in thoughtful, strategic ways.  In areas of financial market 
regulation, traditional, rules-based oversight and regulation is highly 
appropriate in areas either spared by rapid structural disintermediation or 
where the pace of change is predictable, allowing authorities to stay ahead 
of the regulatory curve.  By contrast, objectives-based approaches should be 
deployed where the velocity of innovation is highest, but where 
fundamental changes to the relationship between market participants remain 
stable enough for efficient (though at times expensive) enforcement.  
Experimentation and pilot programs, which likely involve the greatest 
capital resources, should, meanwhile, be practiced sparingly and 
strategically, either where project designs can minimize costs or where 
uncertainty is greatest and the potential risks to investor protection—market 
stability or capital formation—is highest.  That way, hypotheses can be 
tested and reforms made in a way in which policymakers are informed by 
not only the opinions of stakeholders, but also market data and empirical 
evidence. 
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In both of the latter two instances, technology should be embraced as a 
source of not only regulatory risk, but also of regulatory opportunity.  One 
of the primary challenges that disruptive technology poses is that 
technology moves quickly, outstripping the capacity of regulators to 
understand or respond to change.  To better equip them, information 
technology should be deployed to help keep investors better informed of the 
risks concerning their investments, without unnecessarily hiking disclosure 
costs.  But even more can be done.  Regulators can themselves develop 
algorithmic tools to help police fraud online.  Information processing data 
analytics, similarly, could (and should) be used to constantly measure 
outcomes in submarkets like 144A or alternative venues like dark pools.  
And a flexible administrative platform could be developed across the SEC 
and other agencies, building on these tools, to enable regulators to adapt 
quickly to changing circumstances and ensure satisfaction of regulatory 
goals.  Only at that point will regulators find themselves in a position not 
only to respond to disruptive innovation, but to track it in real time and, 
even more importantly, to mitigate its excesses. 
CONCLUSION 
The accelerating interplay of law and technology in securities markets is 
underdeveloped, both descriptively and normatively.  All too often, 
commentators have assumed that though markets change, regulation is itself 
operationalized against a static, stable set of market gatekeepers, and the 
literature has failed to account for—and connect—the varied channels 
through which technology transforms markets.  As a result, the impact of 
technology on capital markets regulation has itself been obfuscated.  This 
Article has attempted to provide clarity, by tracing the regulatory structure 
that guides securities law approaches and then describing how deep 
microstructural changes in twenty-first-century capital markets are 
transforming the regulatory ecosystem across issue areas. 
The preceding pages demonstrated that not all “disruption” is the same 
and that changes in securities issuances and investment, market 
microstructure, and trading have come from a variety of quarters.  In some 
instances, the ability to connect traders in far-flung places more effectively 
and faster than ever before has changed the strategic dynamics driving 
market liquidity, whereas in others, advances in artificial intelligence have 
led to equally profound results for trading.  And in yet other instances, 
developments in regulatory approaches, which reflect as much changes in 
political cycles as economic ones, can enable incremental changes that, 
when paired with revolutions in information technology, can fundamentally 
restructure securities markets.  In the process, traditional gatekeepers have 
been increasingly sidelined as new actors occupy central positions in the 
processing of capital transactions. 
Notably, this development is not in itself a necessarily “bad” one.  
Indeed, it is not only capital markets that have changed, but society as well.  
With new platforms (web based and otherwise), forms of media, and 
interconnectivity, the ability to disseminate information is greater than at 
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any previous point in history, as are the potential means by which investors 
can arm themselves with information before making investments or trades. 
But there are challenges.  Just as the modes and means of disseminating 
information have multiplied, so have opportunities with which fraud can be 
conducted and markets manipulated.  Furthermore, changes in the market 
ecosystem and competitive dynamics are changing the incentives for market 
participants and gatekeepers in ways that may not always bolster financial 
stability or investor protection.  Issuers are able to raise as much capital via 
nonpublic devices and private placement infrastructure as through IPOs; 
exchanges are no longer sources of capital but increasingly seekers of 
liquidity; and broker-dealers are able to connect investors in ways that they 
increasingly resemble exchanges. 
All along, from a theoretical and policy perspective, basic tenets of 
securities regulation are undergoing profound transformation.  Just what a 
“public” offering means is no longer easy to identify when private markets 
enjoy breadths and levels of participation that rival traditional section 5 
offerings.  “Listings” no longer are exclusively relegated to exchange 
architecture, as private platforms, websites, and portals can advertise 
offerings for sale and, in some instances, trading.  Even the concept of an 
“exchange” has been moved as trading volumes are increasingly located in 
venues that, though not always regulated as exchanges, are hosting the 
lion’s share of secondary trading—trading that is itself done via computers 
rather than human beings. 
Although the extent to which existing administrative tools are capable of 
engaging these challenges is not entirely known, indications are that New 
Deal regulatory procedures will need to be rethought and reimagined in 
order to cope with the dynamic change animating markets and market 
activity.  In a world where trades are executed in milliseconds, regulatory 
ruminations that drag on for months, just to be quickly made irrelevant or 
outdated once implemented, seem flat-footed.  Furthermore, where 
information is sparse—given the unpredictability about law, markets, and 
their interaction with one another—flexibility seems warranted and needed 
in twenty-first-century market regulation.  In particular, a thoughtful pivot 
to regulatory experimentalism is warranted for areas like market 
infrastructure that are characterized by constant flux.  Objectives-based 
regulation, paired with trial-and-error experimentation and adaptation are 
obvious administrative responses that should be incorporated into existing 
administrative procedures along with the resources to supervise such new 
strategies.  In that way, regulators can meet the challenges of regulating 
market participants in a world where not only the behavior of regulated 
entities changes, but also the regulated entities themselves. 
